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This masters thesis provides insight into the concept of privacy. It argues
why privacy is important, and why developers and system owners should
keep privacy in mind when developing and maintaining systems containing
personal information. Following this, a strategy for evaluating the overall
level of privacy in a system is defined. The strategy is then applied to parts
of the cellphone system in an attempt to evaluate the privacy of traffic and
location data in this system.
The thesis was written at the University of Bergen, Department of In-
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“You have zero privacy anyway, get over it.”
Scott McNealy, CEO Sun Microsystems, 1999
In 1969, an American research project connected University of California,
Los Angeles and Stanford Research International together and formed the
start of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). This
marked the beginning of the Internet as we know it today, and the academic
network quickly grew in size. In 1991, when the European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN) went public with their WorldWideWeb project
the Internet started to change from something academics and the military
were bothered with, to a natural part of our everyday lives. According to
the Internet Systems Consortium the number of hosts have grown from just
above one million in 1993, to above staggering 600 000 000 [1].
With the growth of the Internet, more and more services have become
available online. Today people use online services for various tasks, anything
from handing in homework, keeping in touch with friends, online shopping,
banking, dating, the list just goes on. Additionally, new services keep emerg-
ing, for quite a few years Norwegians have been able to deliver their tax
returns online, the Norwegian government even has a project on electronic
voting, where one of the goals is to facilitate remote electronic voting [2, 3].
One online technology that has gained a lot of steam lately is social network-
ing. Services like Facebook and Myspace let people build a virtual copy of
their social network. The users are encouraged to connect to people they
know from the real world, disclose how they know them, and share different
types of information.
But as more and more services are brought online, the amounts of infor-
mation about individuals residing on the Internet increases. If someone was
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to fetch information from the different online services, they would probably
be able to tell quite a lot about the individuals registered.
This thesis considers the privacy of such information residing in large in-
formation systems. Alongside the great technological development we have
seen during the last decades, lawmakers have tried to keep up by introduc-
ing new legislation in an effort to regulate how such information should be
protected. But legislation alone does not lead to compliance, and when de-
veloping information systems, that perhaps are to be used over long periods
of time, it is hard to ensure that the systems keep personal information safe;
much like building secure systems is hard.
Throughout this thesis the reader will be given an introduction to pri-
vacy, and to why privacy is important. After this introduction, the thesis
attempts to define an approach that may be employed in order to evaluate
the overall privacy level of large information systems. The idea is that such
a structured approach will be beneficial both to companies and their con-
sumers. Companies are able to verify that they are operating in accordance
to legal requirements, and identify points in their systems where privacy is
suffering, while consumers are ensured that systems are designed with their
privacy in mind.
In addition to the suggested approach, the thesis also contains a privacy
evaluation of personal information residing in the mobile telephone network.
The evaluation is included as an example of how the suggested method may
be used to identify and highlight areas where privacy is not properly taken
care of. As a part of this review, a program for mobile phones was written
to exemplify how geolocalisation of mobile devices can be done.
Privacy is, as we shall se in Chapter 2, a difficult concept to define,
and an area where the amount of subjectivity is large. A certain degree of
privacy may be good enough for one person, while appalling to another. As
a result, I have chosen to write parts of this thesis using first person singular.
This is a conscious choice, that is supposed to stress the subjectivity of the
elements discussed in the sections where this is the case, and that some of
the statements made are hypotheses made by the author, and not necessarily
universal truths.
The intended audience of this thesis is anyone that has an interest in
privacy, but it is specially meant for computer scientists who are develop-
ing systems processing personal information. The hope is that the method
suggested can be a valuable tool in order to ensure the privacy of those who
will one day use the system. I also think that the method described can
be useful for organizations who have systems that are currently containing
personal information, and that applying the method to a live system will
make it possible to identify potential problems; or at the very least give the
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organization a reassurance that they are doing a good job maintaining the
privacy of their customers.
1.1 Structure of the Thesis
The following paragraphs gives an outline of the chapters in the thesis.
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 serves as an introduction to privacy. The chapter starts by trying
to define privacy and continues to argue why privacy is needed, and why
it is important to factor in privacy while developing systems that contain
information about people. It then tries to explain why the erosion of privacy
continues. Many important terms are also defined throughout this chapter,
and it serves as a basis for the rest of the thesis.
Chapter 3
In Chapter 3, the reader is given an introduction to risk management, fol-
lowed by a discussion about metrics. The chapter continues to develop a
method for analyzing the overall privacy in an information system, using
risk management as a source of inspiration.
Chapter 4
In this Chapter, I have applied my own process to parts of the mobile phone
network, and tried to analyze it with respect to privacy of personal informa-
tion contained within the system. The Chapter also contains an introduction
to the most important elements in a mobile phone network, as an understand-
ing of it is needed to say something about the level of privacy it provides.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 contains a summary of the thesis and some conclusions. It also
contains a small section with my reflections and suggestions for future work
on this topic.
Appendix A
In Appendix A a sample midlet I wrote to determine the geographic position
of mobile users is included. The midlet is Sony Ericsson specific, but the
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strategy used for determining the position of a phone is applicable to all
phones where access to network information is granted through API-calls.
Appendix B
Appendix B contains a sample of the information that was given to me by
the phone company I am currently a customer of. It is included to illustrate




“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.”
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, §19
In this chapter I introduce the concept of privacy and define some basic
terms that enable us to dig deeper into the area from a computer science
point of view. Then I argue why we need privacy, despite the fact that
it might seem tempting to trade it in for other short term benefits. Next, I
explain why it is necessary to measure the level of privacy in systems in order
to evaluate it. The Chapter ends with an outline of one approach used by
the American government to ensure that privacy is preserved in information
systems.
2.1 What is Privacy
Although privacy is something everyone seems to have an opinion on, and
many have strong feelings about, giving a crisp definition of privacy is not a
simple task. It is a task that has puzzled philosophers and scholars for cen-
turies without yet reaching a consensus. The modern debate around privacy
surfaced in 1890 after the publication of a famous paper titled “The Right to
Privacy” by the two american lawyers Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Bran-
deis, where they argued about the existence of a right to privacy [4]. Back
then, as today, privacy advocates were worried that emerging technologies
would increase the overall exposure of people’s private lives and undermine
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their privacy. Warren and Brandeis argued that a fundamental right to pri-
vacy existed and that it should be granted protection by the juridical system.
Privacy has different meanings in different settings, and is more of an
umbrella term for different personal rights. Usually, the term privacy is used
in two different senses. Physical privacy, thought of as a right to prevent
intrusion into ones physical space, such as a home, as well as the right to se-
clude oneself from others. The other type of privacy is informational privacy,
seen as the right to seclude and control data about oneself.
The quote at the beginning of the Chapter is article 19 in the International
Human Rights Charter, and it is interpreted to include the right to privacy as
a human right. Even though considered to be a human right, very few nations
include privacy as a part of their constitution, Norway is not an exception,
although a recent study initiated by the Norwegian government recommended
that privacy should be given its own constitutional protection [5, Ch. 19].
Today privacy in many countries is protected through a number of laws,
regulations, and juridical precedence. Searching for the perfect definition of
privacy and giving a thorough overview of how it is legally protected around
the world is far beyond the scope of this thesis, for a good overview of privacy,
and how privacy is protected by laws and agreements the reader is referred
to the human rights organisation Privacy International and their overview of
privacy [6].
2.2 Do We Really Need it?
As the quotation at the beginning of Chapter 1 wrote “You have zero privacy—
Get over it.” This statement from Scott McNeally, former CEO at Sun Mi-
crosystems, was given during a product launch in 1999. With discouraging
statements like this, from a high-ranking official in one of the large multina-
tional corporations within the computer industry, it might seem like privacy
was something that only existed back in the 20th century. However, in the
next sections I will argue that this is not the case, and at the very least there
are a few systems where everyone can agree that privacy is needed.
In most discussions between privacy advocates and those who want to
introduce some kind of privacy invasive technology, the argument “if you
have nothing to hide then what are you afraid of?” is brought into play.
The question implies that privacy is about hiding something that is wrong
or illegal. The battle for privacy is rather a battle between the more funda-
mental issue of freedom versus control, and not a battle between privacy and
security [7]. Consequently, privacy is not about hiding something wrong, but
about having the freedom to seclude personal information or oneself if one
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desires to.
Most types of crime could probably be prevented or discovered if we
just introduce enough measures of controlling the actions of individuals and
groups. Again it breaks down to which type of society we want to live in.
The famous book “Nineteen Eighty Four” by George Orwell [8] portrays a
society controlled by “the party.” Everyone is under constant surveillance
and any action deemed wrong, in one way or another, may lead to getting
arrested by the “thought police.” A more recent book of fiction is “Little
Brother” by Cory Doctrow [9]. The book brings us into the life of a young
boy that takes on the Department of Homeland Security, after they react to a
terrorist attack by deploying all sorts of surveillance techniques, undermining
the first amendment.
Of course these books are merely works of fiction, but for several years
there have been initiatives for automatic profiling of airline passengers in
the US through the earlier CAPPS program, and the suggested CAPPS
II program [10]. As a side note, most of the techniques deployed by the
Department of Homeland Security in the book by Doctrow, already exist,
and are used in large scale on a day-to-day basis. The difference between
fiction and the real world lies in how the technologies are used.
The British Home Office has recently released a report which states that
automatic profiling is of limited use, partly due to a large number of false
positives [11].
Following from the events of 9/11, but also from the continuous techno-
logical advances that would have appeared anyway, it is fairly safe to say that
the amount of privacy a person enjoys in the western world today has not
increased during the last decade. Numerous CCTV systems have been de-
ployed, border-controls have been intensified, electronic passports and other
ID-card schemes have been deployed, and these are just a few examples of
large-scale systems that to some degree facilitate surveillance and under-
mine people’s privacy. New emerging technologies may be used in different
attempts at creating a safer society, although they might be very privacy
invasive. For such technologies it can be argued that the individuals right to
privacy outweighs the benefits that the specific technology is able to deliver,
and that society is best of with them not deployed.
Many see privacy as a fundamental requirement for a well functioning
democratic society. The term democracy is interpreted differently all around
the world, but the foundation is a form of government where the people hold
the power, and everyone is granted fundamental rights and freedoms. Privacy
includes rights to gather information and to decide for oneself, and is thus
necessary for something as basic as a free democratic election.
In a talk given at the German Chaos Computer Club Camp in 2007, the
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philosopher Sandro Gaycken argues that in many of the discussions between
privacy advocates and others arguing for more surveillance, privacy advocates
are using arguments with soft values that fail to persuade people toward
wanting more privacy [12]. Claims as “I don‘t like being watched” becomes
insignificant in comparison with “This technology has shown to reduce serious
and or violent crimes this much.” Gaycken presents arguments advocating
privacy and place these in three areas, psychological, sosioeconomical, and
technopolitical consequences of surveillance. In the following paragraphs, I
will present some of his arguments of why and how surveillance technologies
can affect society in different ways.
2.2.1 The Good, the Bad, and Me?
In many situations surveillance equipment is used to enforce laws, and to
prevent certain actions, ranging from preventing vandalism to enforcing speed
limits on roads. Nevertheless, the way these laws are being enforced reflects
a set of values that are believed to be important, at least by those spending
money on these systems. A known “problem” in science is the observer effect,
by observing something you affect it. In psychology, the effect is referred
to as the Hawthorne effect. While studying the effectiveness of workers it
was realized that productivity was higher when the workers knew they were
under evaluation [13]. Gaycken argues that people who know they are under
surveillance may be influenced by the surveillance in the same way. He further
argues that people will somehow react to surveillance by trying to behave in
accordance to, or in opposition to, what they think the observer wants.
A society where surveillance is conspicuously present may result in a
monoculture of values. Individuality, the ability to judge ethically from own
beliefs and opinions might be replaced with the capability to decide whether
or not an action is in accordance with established values. Gaycken compares
this tendency with studies done on children with overprotective mothers.
Such studies have shown that these children get indecisive and very depen-
dent of their mothers. They have poor ethical competence, and are behaving
either like their mother wants them to, or in defiance with their mothers’
wishes. Of course this is something that happens in an extreme setting, but
just how much the current level of surveillance affects us as individuals is un-
known, and do we really wish for a society where the amount of surveillance
affects our daily behavior? I personally believe his arguments carry water,
and that they should be the foundation of a discussion about privacy and
surveillance.
Another problem with a surveillance infrastructure, and the resulting lack
of privacy, that Gaycken brings up is how such an infrastructure facilitates
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Figure 2.1: How surveillance is used to protect values in a perfect world.
the growth of a new class society based on automatic profiling.
People and organizations wanting to apply some form of surveillance, be
it camera surveillance or large scale logging and processing of information, of
course never say that they have bad intentions. They want to use technology
to protect what they, and generally most of society, consider to be some kind
of good against some kind of evil. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 where
surveillance is used to protect good from the bad and the ugly.
But who decides what is good and what is not? Generally people agree
that most forms of crime are bad and should thus be fought; although most
of us also include the notion of proportionality, meaning that society should
not use any means possible in order to fight any kind of crime. Methods used
to fight crime has to be proportional to how bad we consider the specific act
to be.
A large corporation however does not necessarily care about all crime,
what is important to them is generally to maximize their profit, and to avoid
engaging in business with people and organizations that are not profitable to
them. After all that is what the stockholders are expecting. The shift in pri-
orities turns the table a bit in terms of surveillance. If such an organization is
the owner of a surveillance infrastructure, suddenly good in the sense society
sees it, has been substituted by profit, and evil has been substituted with
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Figure 2.2: What if the owner seeks to maximize their profits?
the poor and the needy. Thus turning the use of surveillance away from the
ideal situation illustrated by Figure 2.1, into a less ideal situation depicted
in Figure 2.2; illustrating how the incentives of system owners influence how
a certain technology is used.
As more surveillance technologies, and other privacy pervasive systems,
are introduced in the name of “war against terror” or “for the sake of the
children” in the western world, it gets harder to argue against the deployment
of surveillance and privacy invasive systems in countries whose governments
more resembles dictatorships. How can we argue that it is okay for us to
deploy such systems, but not for them? In countries ruled by dictatorships,
or any other totalitarian form of state, the use of privacy invasive systems are
further shifted from the original intentions. Here systems may be employed
to protect the elite, or the dictator, against everyone else as illustrated in
Figure 2.3.
Some of the examples Gaycken uses involves taking the argumentation
to the extreme, and exemplify worst case scenarios, but nonetheless he has
a lot of good points and for those interested in privacy the German Chaos
Computer Club has a video of his talk available at [12]. Even if his scenarios
are extreme, I have not been able to find any research talking about how the
current level of surveillance is affecting us.
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Figure 2.3: What if the system is controlled by a dictator?
2.3 Why Does the Privacy Erosion Continue?
As we saw in the previous Section, there exists solid and well-fundamented
reasons to preserve privacy, and some of them seem very important. In
particular, privacy is a necessity for a functioning democracy, and its absence
can affect our ability to judge ethically. We also saw that the widespread
deployment of privacy invasive systems seems to continue at full speed. In
this section, I will try to give some insights as to why such systems keep on
emerging.
The English word “surveillance” came from French and literally means
to watch over or care for. Georg Apenes, the director of the Norwegian Data
Inspectorate once said that big brother walks hand in hand with big mother
[14]; implying that some of the systems undermining privacy are there to
control those under surveillance, while other systems exist to protect people
from known and unknown dangers they may expose themselves to, as a caring
mother would do. He argued that big mother represents the democratic
state, and its overeagerness to care for its citizens, and making sure that
they adhere to what the state considers their best interests. So while some
systems are there as necessary safeguards to prevent people from cheating
the state, and to prevent civil servants and the government from cheating
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the people, some systems are there as a result of overeager people trying to
care for you and me. Systems that need to be in place to secure the welfare
state are necessary, but privacy could probably benefit from system design
taking privacy into account. Other systems though are unnecessary and
should never have been deployed. One example is the camera surveillance of
public transportation. A lot of research on CCTV and its effectiveness exists,
most of it concludes that there is no significant reductions in violent crime in
areas where CCTV has been deployed [15, 16]. The arguments used by the
owners when they sought to deploy the surveillance of busses and trains, was
that the surveillance was supposed to prevent robbery and violent episodes
targeted at their employees [17]. While they are presenting it to the public
as something they do for the safety of travellers.
According to [18], 91% of those asked are positive to surveillance of public
areas, 79% states that cameras make them feel safer, but still 41% do not
like the increased amount of cameras. One point in this survey that was
particularly interesting was the fact that people who generally felt safe where
they travelled daily, felt more safe if they were in areas with CCTV. People
who answered that they felt unsafe did not report feeling safer in areas with
CCTV. So it seems that cameras make people who already feel safe, feel
safer. While people who does not feel safe are unaffected whether an area
is under surveillance or not, aligning with research stating that surveillance
does not significantly reduce violent crimes.
Another example more related to computers is the recent deployment
of electronic tickets in Oslo, which will be further discussed in Chapter 3,
where information about every trip made using a personal card is stored in
a central database to provide end-users with different value-added services.
But is this really something the end-users want? Some of them might value
such services and are willing to trade in their privacy while others are not.
In this, as in many other cases, the system owner decides what is best for
their customers, and deploy an infrastructure in order to help them. However
such infrastructures, as is the case with the one deployed in Oslo, might also
double as surveillance systems.
To conclude, some of the systems eroding privacy are deployed as a result
of a real necessity. However, many of these systems could have less impact on
privacy if a more appropriate system design had been used. Some systems are
deployed from a genuine wish to protect and care for customers and citizens,
but some of these systems may have a high price in terms of privacy and
society would be better of without them. While others again are built by
small organizations or companies in order to protect their own assets. This
might not have large consequences when done on a small scale, but when
everyone implements such systems the total impact may be quite large.
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2.4 Privacy and Personal Information
Up until now this chapter has been about what privacy is, and arguments
for and against privacy in different settings. Hopefully the reader is now
ready to dig deeper into how information is used in computer systems and
how privacy is eroded in many cases. We start by defining some important
terminology and concepts.
2.4.1 Personal Information
Personal information can loosely be defined as any kind of information about
a person; ranging from his or hers favorite chocolate, to social security num-
bers and fingerprints. One thing to note is that it is not necessary for a piece
of information to be directly linkable to an individual for it to be consid-
ered personal information. For instance by themselves the following pieces of
personal information “24 years,” “Computer Science Student,” “from Fusa,
Norway” do not relate to the author of this thesis. But if one knows that
they are all information about the same person they might identify the au-
thor uniquely. Information derived from such facts is also in many cases
considered to be personal information. Information about an individual’s
net income, mortgage, and payment history can be used to describe the per-
son’s financial situation from which one might further deduce whether or not
he or she is to be considered a prompt payer. The European Data Protection
Directive from 1995 uses the term “Personal Data” and gives it the following
definition:
“‘personal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person(data subject); an identifiable person is one who
can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or social identity.”
[19, Article 2.a]
2.4.2 Sensitive Personal Information
In many countries, a subset of personal information is given special protec-
tion, because it contains information considered to be sensitive. In Norway,
as in most other EU countries, information about race, ethnicity, religious
views, criminal records, health information, sexual preferences, relations, and
union memberships are granted special protection under the law [20, §2 Sec.
8] [19].
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However, it is the author’s view that sensitive information should be
thought of as “information an individual believes should be kept private,”
acknowledging that this is a matter of personal preferences. According to the
survey mentioned earlier in the chapter, people’s view of what they consider
as personal information does not align with the current legislation [18]. In
Norway people seem to be more willing to share information about their po-
litical and religious views and union membership, than their National Birth
Number (NBN) and their cellphone number. Neither of these two numbers
are granted any special protection by law, and the phone number is in most
cases available in the phone book, and on numerous of online services. The
authors of the survey point out that they believe people may have misinter-
preted the question, and this possibility should be taken into consideration
when trying to interpret the results. Another possible explanation is that
how people may misuse a phone number or an NBN is simpler to imagine
than how information about ones religion might be exploited.
Either way, the reader should now know that sensitive personal infor-
mation exists, and in many countries such information is granted special
juridical protection. One does not need to look more than seventy years
back in time to imagine what consequences a comprehensive list of people’s
religious views would have had. So when developing a digital system that
manages personal information, one should check whether or not the system
will be dealing with sensitive personal information. If that is the case, one
should do a thorough analysis of the privacy in the system design.
2.4.3 Identities and Identifiers
In different settings on the Internet we use different identities. On Facebook
you present yourself with your given name, and an email, but on other sites
people use pseudonyms, e.g. “ladiesman217.” On government sites or in on-
line banks, at least in Norway, the de facto standard to identify yourself is
to use your NBN. All these identities contain a subset of an individual’s per-
sonal information, and as we have demonstrated a person can have multiple
identities, perhaps even overlapping identities. For instance an identity in a
bank contains a lot of financial data that is mapped to an individual using
an NBN, while the census authority has information about where individuals
live, but also use NBNs to map an address to a unique individual.
When discussing identifiers, we see that some identifiers are in a sense
“stronger” that others. A person’s NBN is handed out at birth, follows
the individual from cradle to grave, and never changes, except in some very
special situations (e.g. sex change operations). In general an identifier is
strong if it allows a unique mapping to a specific individual in a population.
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Later in the thesis we will look at how broad, or even wrong, use of strong
identifiers can reduce privacy. An alternative to strong identifiers is to use
multiple identifiers that in themselves do not allow a unique mapping, but
when held together provide a mapping with a certain degree of confidence.
2.4.4 Personal Information and Crime
The advent of the information age has undoubtedly made a lot of things
easier for everybody, including criminals and fraudsters. The Internet allows
for people located in one country to carry out certain types of crime on the
other side of the world. According to Symantec’s annual Internet threat
rapport, the Internet has facilitated an entire underground economy where
one can buy or sell information that can be used to commit different types
of online fraud and other types of online crime [21].
One of the rising forms of crime seems to be identity theft. Identity
theft occurs when someone uses another individual’s personal information to
impersonate him or her [22, p. 96]. Usually, identity theft is carried out with
the intent of gaining access to some form of good, this can be everything from
getting issued a credit card to using someones’ store discount. When trying
to commit crimes such as identity theft or fraud, having as much information
as possible about the subject you try to impersonate is very helpful.
Identity theft combined with a general lack of security around personal
information enables criminals to harvest vast amounts of information without
making a lot of effort. A good example of harvesting is illustrated in [23].
We are shown how Norwegian telephone companies made very user-friendly
sign-up procedures where all you needed to start the registration process was
an NBN, filling the NBN into a form and pressing enter fetched your name,
address, performed a credit check, and presented it all neatly on-screen.
NBNs are highly structured and therefore it is simple to generate valid
numbers for any given day [24]. So by generating valid NBNs, and inputting
them to the websites in an automated way, one could harvest a lot of infor-
mation about Norwegian citizens. Namely the individual’s NBN, his name,
address, and an indication on whether or not he or she was to be considered
creditworthy by the telephone company. It is important to note that one
did not need to have a prior relationship with one of the the companies in
order for them to leak your name, address, and NBN because the companies
bought services from others who had more or less direct access to the census
database.
A person’s NBN was never intended as a way of authenticating that
someone is indeed who he or she claims to be, but still many vendors used
to grant access to various services based on the knowledge of an NBN. One
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vendor went as far as issuing you a credit card as long as you had a valid
NBN and a working e-mail address. In another recent article [25], a reporter
investigated how much personal information about himself was lying around
on the Internet. He found it to be frightfully much, the list included his
Social Security Number, addresses dating back to 1975, and affiliations with
various nonprofit organizations.
It is clear that a lot of information about people is already freely avail-
able on the Internet, and much of the information one can find there is
regarded as public and should not be of any concern. In fact much of the
openness is a requirement for a well-functioning democratic society. But
accidents keep happening, and from time to time, some company or govern-
ment branch experience a security breach and a following leakage of sensitive
personal information. One can name numerous examples where personal in-
formation considered private has been leaked either by accident or foul play.
For instance, the loss of a harddrive in Britain containing personal infor-
mation about 100 000 soldiers and 600 000 potential recruits, or the New
Zeelander who bought an mp3 player containing documents about American
soldiers, camps, and supply plans in Iraq. The interested reader might visit
the American nonprofit organization “Privacy Rights Clearinghouse” for a
comprehensive list of American data breaches [26].
2.5 State of the Union
Several big organizations have already implemented routines and business
processes to ensure that old systems do not constitute serious privacy risks,
and that new systems under development are as secure and privacy friendly
as possible. The United Stated passed the “E-government Act of 2002”
that was supposed to improve the management of and promote the use of
electronic government services. The act also went far in recognizing that the
growth of new digital techniques and devices might have severe impact on the
privacy of people’s personal information. As a result, the act required that
in the future, government agencies must analyze the possible ramifications
of privacy whenever designing a new system, or substantially revising old
ones. Such a review is called a “Privacy Impact Assessment”(PIA) and is
meant to cover the most important parts of how a system handles personal
information.
One of the governmental bodies in the US that provides a lot of online
material about how to conduct a PIA is the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS). Based on their web pages, and a memorandum from the Office of
Management and Budget, I will give a brief overview of the most important
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parts in a PIA. For more thorough information the reader should visit the
web pages of the DHS [27].
The DHS material consists of nine sections where the people that are
carrying out the evaluation are asked to answer certain questions. They are
also given some guidelines as to how detailed the answers should be, and
what they should cover. Each of these sections cover different sides of how
personal information is managed, starting with questions elaborating on the
management of the information, and ending with questions where the writers
are asked to discuss how the subject at hand affects overall privacy.
The most important sections in a PIA are those that cover characteri-
zation and use of the information, retention and sharing. Also included in
the PIA are sections for covering how those whose information is registered
in the system are informed about it, and their rights to access, redress, and
correct the information.
As we shall see in the next chapter, the division into these nine topics
make very good sense when trying to determine, or document, the level
of privacy in a computer system that processes personal information. In the
next chapter I will introduce a number of controls that we will use to evaluate
the privacy in a system. The general idea is that by ensuring that a few of
these controls are in place we are able to say something about the overall
level of privacy offered by a specific system. The reader will then see how




Measuring Privacy in Computer
Systems
Quis custodiet custoder ipsos?—Who watches the Watchers?
The previous chapter gave an introduction to privacy, and looked at how
a few organizations and government bodies are trying to ensure that their in-
formation systems preserve privacy. This chapter starts with an introduction
to risk management in computer systems, how it is done, and some remarks
about what is considered best practises. In risk management there are two
main methods used to quantify risks, namely qualitative and quantitative risk
management, both methods will be introduced and it is outlined how they
are used to measure risks. The risk management introduction is followed by
the introduction of privacy controls. I suggest some controls that will aid in
the process of evaluating the overall privacy level offered by an information
system. These controls will then be used at the end of the chapter, as parts
in a proposed formal privacy reviewing process inspired by risk management.
3.1 Risk Management in Computer Systems
Risk management is a process that enables those performing it to identify
the risks that they, and other stakeholders are exposed to and manage these
risks. The goal is to determine which, if any, of the identified risks that
are too high, and to devise strategies to remove, or at least, mitigate these
risks. The National Institute of Standards defines risk management as ‘the
process of identifying risk, assessing risk, and taking steps to reduce risk to
an acceptable level” [28].
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Risk is defined differently depending on the setting. For instance, when
playing the lotteries you can either lose or win. Since playing the lottery
usually involves placing a bet there is a risk involved, this type of risk is
often referred to as speculative risk. Risk management focuses solely on
managing risks that have a negative impact on a business or a system. This
type of risk is referred to as pure, or non-speculative risk. So to us a risk is
simply the possibility of suffering loss or harm.
When developing software it is usually a requirement that the software is
secure, meaning that it should be able to function correctly under malicious
attacks [29]. Many different methodologies for development of such software
exist. Common for most of them is the use of a risk management process,
that is to help reduce the overall risk level of the application. Most such
development methodologies consider security, but some of them focus on
security more than others, amongst these are Microsoft’s Secure Development
Lifecycle (SDL) [30]. However, the different methodologies incorporate a lot
of the same “best practices” in order to achieve a high level of security,
and these are summarized in Figure 3.1. In this Figure, a general Software
Development Lifecycle(SDLC) is seen with the different best practices placed
where they generally belong; showing that risk management has grown to be
a well established practice in software development, and that it should be
considered an important contribution to software security.
Figure 3.1: The SDLC with all best-practise security measures filled in, the
figure is inspired by [31].
In general, a risk management process consists of two steps, risk assess-
ment followed by a risk treatment. Figure 3.2 gives a high level view of the
process [28].
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Figure 3.2: A high-level view of a risk management process.
3.1.1 Risk Assessment
The desired output from a risk assessment is a set of quantified risks. In
order to achieve this, one starts off by getting a complete system overview,
identifying assets, stakeholders, and describing the purpose of the system.
An asset can be everything form a physical hardware device to a piece of
software or data. The importance of data that resides on an organization’s
information systems should not be downplayed. In many instances the data
are far more worth than both the hardware and software. Identifying the
stakeholders of the system is also important, because we should consider risks
affecting other stakeholders than the one carrying out the risk management
process. There are several reasons for considering risk to other stakeholders.
If shortcomings in your system inflicts damage on someone else, do you have
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to compensate them? Also, incidents not harming you directly can do so
indirectly, for instance from to bad publicity leading to loss of reputation.
After mapping out the system, the two next stages in the risk assessment
is threat and vulnerability identification. A threat, or a threat agent, is
defined as an entity that may cause harm to your system by exploiting a
vulnerability, either intentionally or unintentionally. Threats can be hackers,
script kiddies, insiders with different types of privileges, users behaving badly,
and natural disasters such as fires and earthquakes. A vulnerability can be
said to be susceptibility to some kind of injury or damage, or a weakness in
your system allowing someone to inflict damage by exercising the weakness.
Having identified vulnerabilities and threats, one goes on to combine these
into pairs of threats and vulnerabilities. Afterwards each of these pairs are
given a likelihood, indicating how likely it is for the threat to exploit the
vulnerability.
To qualify as a risk there has to exist both a threat and a vulnerability.
If there is no-one around to exploit the vulnerabilities, then they do not
constitute risks. Likewise if there are no vulnerabilities the number of threat
agents does not matter.
Having paired off threats and vulnerabilities one continues to sort these
based on how severe an impact they can have on your business. How the
ranking of risks should be done will be further discussed in Section 3.1.3
3.1.2 Risk Treatment
After identifying and ranking the risks one has to decide how to manage the
individual risks. Some of the risks may be negligible and can be ignored.
Ignoring a specific risk should of course always be a result of careful consid-
eration and generally a cost/benefit analysis is used to make the decision.
The acceptance of a risk can happen when the impact of an incident is so
small that just dealing with incidents as they appear consume less resources
than fixing the problems. Some of the risks may have a low probability of
occurrence, thus one can assume that they occur so seldom that they too
would cost more to prevent than to accept. Deciding to not mitigate risk is
referred to as accepting the risk.
Other risks can be so severe that one has to do something to mitigate
them. Different ways of mitigating severe risks exist. For instance one might
be able to transfer the risk. Transferring a risk is, as the name implies, to take
a risk that you are exposed to and somehow transfer it to other stakeholders.
Risk transfer is typically done every day by car owners, when they buy an
insurance they transfer most of the risk in the case of an accident to an
insurance company in exchange for a fee. One can also choose to reduce the
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risk by implementing different kind of controls and safeguards. In banking,
an example of a safeguard is the requirement of having all transactions above
a certain value authorized by two clerks. Introducing different measures, or
safeguards, in order to reduce or eliminate a risk is called controlling the
risk. Another option is to reject the risk, and choose not to offer a specific
functionality in the system because the risk it would introduce is too high.
A simple illustration can be seen in Figure 3.2 where the risks identified in
the “Risk Assessment” step are distributed into different categories.
3.1.3 Quantifying Risk
What risk mitigation strategy to choose depends on the severeness of the
particular risk. Thus, how risks are quantified is crucial and should reflect
the world as accurately as possible. Focusing the effort and attention where it
is most needed, gives the best return of investments, and reduces the overall
risk exposure as much as possible, hopefully keeping incidents under control.
As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, there are two main meth-
ods used when quantifying risks. When using a quantitative risk management
approach one assumes that over time the incidents have a statistical distri-
bution, e.g. a normal distribution, and one can do statistical computations
on the probabilities. In such an approach the threat/vulnerability pairs are
given estimates of impact, usually in monetary loss, and a probability of
occurrence. Then the risk is calculated using the following formula [32]:
Risk = Impact ∗ Probability of occurrence (3.1)
With such an approach one is able to calculate the expected cost of a
risk. If for instance a certain type of incident would cost a company about
1 000 000 NOK but only have a probability of 0.5%, the risk could be said
to be 5000 NOK, which is the expected average loss of that specific risk. For
another similar incident were the probability is 5%, the risk would be 50 000.
Here, we would start by focusing on the latter risk, as it is the one we expect
to cost us the most.
In some areas the quantitative method might be applicable and produce
sensible results, while in others it might not yield good results. The under-
lying assumption of quantitative risk management is that considering proba-
bility of occurrence makes sense, and that by looking at the past one is able
to predict the future. Even when dealing with systems where the assump-
tion is true, one need to have enough data points for these probabilities to
be accurate. As most companies does not want to talk about their security
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breaches and incidents, compiling a high quality list of data points might be
very difficult.
And even if one manages to create a perfect estimation of the probabili-
ties, the method is still subjective since the monetary loss of incidents is hard
to predict and can vary over time. For instance, downtime in an online bank
might be cheap during the weekend, but what if it happens the week before
Christmas? For those who are interested in more criticism of quantitative
risk management, or risk management in general see Taleb [33].
The other approach to risk quantification is qualitative risk management.
Using a qualitative approach to risk management one decides on a set of
discrete levels that are used to classify the likelihood and the impact of a
risk. A common choice for the levels is “high,” “medium,” and “low” for
both impact and probability, and then one combines the two to create the
final level for the risk. The risk can then be determined using a risk matrix,
as shown in Figure 3.3. The qualitative approach also has its weaknesses.
To a certain degree, it underestimates the risk associated with high impact,
low probability events. As we see from the risk matrix, a high-impact, low-
probability event ends up classified as a medium risk, but such events can
be catastrophic for a business. This is one of the major weaknesses Taleb
points out in his book [33]. In particular, the observation holds true for large
national or international systems of great importance. A discussion of how
to manage these risks is found in [34].
Nevertheless, I argue that the qualitative approach is the best alternative
when securing most computer systems, and the method in [34] only comes
into play in specific cases when talking about large systems of national or
international importance. Using qualitative risk management, enables risk
managers to focus on managing the different risks, and less time worrying
about whether the values for impact and probability are correct. As the
saying goes “it is better to be approximately right than exactly wrong.”
3.2 Privacy Controls
In the previous section, we saw how a qualitative approach is valuable in risk
management of computers, and how it is a tool highlighting the most critical
problems of the system under review. Inspired by the qualitative approach to
risk management, we now turn to analyzing privacy in information systems.
In a system maintaining personal information, the approach of identifying
vulnerabilities and threats can be a viable approach to determine the level
of privacy. But risk management is not about creating 100% secure systems,
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Figure 3.3: An example qualititative risk matrix.
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it is about creating systems that one can afford to live with and planning for
the unexpected. When dealing with people’s personal information, such a
gamble may not be desirable. Therefore, I believe that a different approach
should be used when trying to ensure that a system provides privacy.
The rest of the Chapter is devoted to defining nine general areas where
privacy fails in computer systems. For each area, I introduce the notion of a
control, that should be understood as the ability to manage the privacy issues
related to the specific area. Using this approach one should be able to identify
privacy problems in systems, because one has a clearly defined standard
that one can measure against. The approach also enables organizations and
individuals to take a structured approach when trying to evaluate the privacy
of any given system.
Through the work with my thesis I have found if useful to define two dif-
ferent classes of systems providing privacy namely, systems that offer their
users anonymity and systems that offer users privacy of their personal in-
formation. I will introduce the separate controls for each class of systems.
The word “anonymity” is derived from a Greek word that originally meant
without a name, and in a digital world we should think of a subject as anony-
mous if it is not identifiable within a specific population. While privacy of
personal information follows the definitions that were given in Chapter 2.
3.2.1 Privacy Controls in Systems Offering Anonymity
Many systems do not need their users or data subjects to uniquely identify
themselves in order to deliver services. Such systems span from simple web-
pages that just provide readers with static information to large multi-user
systems that process information for various reasons. There seems to be a lot
of scepticism towards offering true anonymous services though, largely due
to the potential for misuse. The upside of anonymous services however might
be greater than the downside, and in some cases the ability to be anonymous
is a life and death issue. For instance many human rights organizations rely
on anonymity services in order to stay in contact with people in countries
where freedom of speech is limited. A negative comment about the Chinese
government can in some cases be enough to land you in jail, and it has been
known that Chinese human rights fighters use The Onion Router (TOR) net-
work to communicate with the outside world. The TOR network facilitates
anonymous internet access originally developed with the support of the US
Navy [35].
Recently there has been some outcry in Norway due to a new electronic
ticket system in Oslo. Users are complaining that the system is logging
far too much information about them, e.g. when they travel, where they
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travel from, and what direction the vehicle they entered is traveling. All the
information collected by the system is available to everyone with access to
the system, and the user’s full name, address, and birth-date are stored in
the system [36]. A thorough analyze of how such a system could be built
to offer anonymous traveling is outside the scope of this thesis, but is it
really necessary for every company in such an electronic-ticket collaboration
to have access to your full travel history? I for one think not. Fare collection
systems for public transportation should be built in accordance with the right
an individual has to free movement, something that one can argue a thorough
logging of ones movements is not. The wish to store as much information as
possible seems to be somewhat symptomatic for new systems that are being
deployed.
In order to offer anonymity, a system needs to have two properties. One
should not be able to trace an action performed in the system back to a
user, and one should not be able to deduce which actions in the system
are performed by the same user. These two properties will be referred to
as untractability and unlinkability, and will be closer described in the two
following sections. Both properties are defined as controls in systems offering
anonymity.
Untraceability
It should no be possible to trace actions back to a user.
As stated, a system that aims to offer its users anonymity should be
built in such a way that actions performed in the system cannot be linked
to a specific user. Traditional election schemes require that it should not be
possible for anyone to determine what a specific individual voted for, while
you usually have to register yourself in order to place a vote. Voting systems
are thus good examples of systems that contain personal information, but
still ensure that an action, in this case posting a vote, cannot be linked to
the individual who performed it.
On the Internet, the use of pseudonyms is a common way to obtain a
certain degree of anonymity, since a pseudonym generally is not easy link-
able with an individual’s real identity. However, when using the Internet, if
no precautionary steps have been taken, every service one visits know the
originating IP address, and thus users are largely traceable.
Generally, in any system, the harder it is to track a specific task to a
unique individual the higher the level of anonymity is expected to be.
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Unlinkability
It should not be possible to link actions performed by a specific user.
If a specific user interacts with a system that is to offer anonymity multiple
times, it should not be possible for anyone to create a list containing the
different tasks performed by a single user. One should note that the ability
to generate such a list does not translate into determining who the user is.
Just that the same user performed all the tasks in a list. Over time, a list
can grow quite extensive and it might be possible to use bits of information
from different tasks, viewing them together in a wider context, to uniquely
determine the identity of the individual behind the actions.
In 2006, an employee at America Online (AOL) published search queries
for 650 000 AOL users from within a three month period. The data was
anonymized before they were published by replacing the AOL username
with a serialnumber. By doing so they thought that researchers could use
the dataset without interfering with the privacy of those who had done the
searches. AOL was wrong. By looking at the content in the search strings it
was possible to deduce the person behind the number. Something the New
York Times decided to do with user 4417749. User 4417749 had done several
hundred searches in the three month period for which data was published.
Some of the queries used to track down the person hiding behind the number
are listed below.
• 60 single men.
• Numb fingers.
• Several queries involving people with Arnold as their last name.
• Landscapers in Lillburn, GA.
From these strings one can assume that the person is a female, living some-
where in Lillburn Georgia, she is probably in her 60s and single. The re-
porter from the Times did not user very much time to track down 62 year
old Thelma Arnold from Lillburn Georgia, a widow with a dog and an inter-
est in her friends ailments [37]. A good illustration on how different pieces
of information, that by themselves do not necessarily identify an individ-
ual, when linked together can reveal a lot more information than what was
originally intended.
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3.2.2 Privacy Controls in Personal Information Sys-
tems
While the two previous controls address key issues related to providing
anonymity in a general information system, the controls introduced here
will be of use in systems where the goal is to keep users’ private information
confined within the specified boundaries. In real world applications, the na-
ture of personal information being stored is diverse, and for some sensitive
types of information, a privacy breach may cause permanent damage to the
individuals whose information is disclosed. A typical example of such data is
health-related information as there are many different diagnoses in the world,
some with greater stigma than others.
The fact that a system needs sensitive personal information in itself should
not disqualify it from being built, but care has to be taken to build in privacy
and security from the beginning. As with security, privacy is generally not
something that can be added to a system once it is up and running, it has
to be introduced from the very start of the development process.
Collection
Any information system should only collect the minimum amount of personal
information that it needs to fulfil its purpose.
By collecting more data than really needed the potential loss in the event
of a data breach is higher that necessary, something that may have unfor-
tunate consequences for your data subjects, whom in many cases are your
customers. Doing so may also make the system seem more invasive than it
really is, as the list of information it collects is unnecessary large.
One cause of privacy erosion is function creep. Systems that are built
for one purpose collects, processes, and stores information to solve a specific
problem. Over time other problems that might be easily solved using the
same information arise. Since the information is already collected, it is easy
to use it in order to solve the new problem. For instance, in Norway we
have recently had a spike in the number of roads that require toll, and an
automatic system for tolling named autoPASS has been introduced in major
cities. At the start of 2009, thirteen of the toll-financed roads in Norway used
autoPASS to do road tolling, including the city centers of Oslo and Bergen.
In order to carry out the automatic tolling, the autoPASS system registers
information every time a car passes through the toll-gates, and stores the
information in a central database. After a couple of years of using the system,
tax authorities in Norway realized that they could use information from it
to determine whether or not people were paying the taxes they should for
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private use of company issued cars. If the tax authorities wants to build such
an infrastructure themselves, it would lead to public outcry and it would
never happen. But by using registers already available, the public outcry
may not be large enough to prevent them access to the register. At the time
of writing, it has not yet been decided whether or not the tax authorities
should be granted access to these data.
The purpose of systems that have an impact on the users’ privacy is
important when deciding whether or not it should be built. For some systems,
the advantages may outweigh the disadvantages. Automatic tolling systems
is a good example of such a system. On one hand it allows for a better traffic
flow, and is very convenient for all parts. On the other hand the system
deployed in Norway today have a huge impact on privacy by storing time,
date, and position for every passing of a toll gate. Most people are willing to
compromise and trade some of their privacy for convenience. But for those
that are not, the system should have alternatives, which is not the case today.
Once the system is in place, like with AutoPASS, other ways to use the
information is thought of and implemented. The new uses of the information
may be far more controversial than the initial use, and had it been known
beforehand it might have lead to the system’s dismissal. To combat function
creep as much as possible, systems should be designed to collect as little
information as possible.
Retention
Personal information should be retained for the shortest possible period.
The shorter the period of retention, the higher one can expect the level
of privacy to be. In a system where personal information is deleted after
a short time, there is, naturally, less information available in the case of a
breach. Short retention periods also increase the level of privacy by reducing
the historical data available to system owners.
When discussing retention of data, a brief discussion of how such historical
data might be used, and or misused, is in place. The last decennium different
knowledge discovery techniques have gained a lot of steam, and especially
data mining and automatic profiling. With the advent of the information
society, the amounts of data available have grown to the skies. To make
sense of the incredible amounts of information one need ways of sorting the
information and finding those pieces of information that are truly interesting.
The aforementioned knowledge discovery techniques attempt to solve the
problem.
Automatic profiling is large research topic by itself, but it is basically
about dividing pieces of information into classes, based on predefined prop-
30
erties. Generally, in order to do profiling one has to have a purpose for the
profiling, one needs to specify the different profiles, and apply them to a
data set. By doing this one can identify those types of information that are
particularly interesting and discard the rest.
Such techniques are used in several areas, for instance in finance to dis-
cover fraud by looking for unusual transactions. Another area where such
technologies are used is credit rating. As an example, one might have a class
for prompt payers, one for those who are slightly more slack, and one for
those who time after time fail to pay bills before they are due.
Dependent on how such techniques are applied, and their quality, such
data mining may have unwanted effects. How would you like to be wrongly
classified as a bad payer, or be placed on a no-flight list because automated
processing says you are not behaving like “normal.” In a recent book about
data mining and profiling, Brownsword discusses what the consequences of
a society pervaded by profiling might be [38]. Portraying some of the same
dangers as Gaycken [12], fearing that it may impact peoples ability to make
ethical choices.
As with many other surveillance and privacy invasive techniques and
tools, several governments have been experimenting with automatic profil-
ing of passenger data on international flights. Whether the tests have been
successful or not is unclear, but a recent report indicates that it was not as
fruitful as hoped for [39].
Secondary Use
Collected personal information should only be used for the specific purpose it
was originally collected.
As mentioned in the paragraph about collection, function creep is a large
problem. In many cases only collecting the minimum of information needed
might not be enough. The information might still be valuable for someone
else in order to solve a different problem. Again careful design and imple-
mentation will probably get organizations some way in ensuring that the
information may not be used for other purposes than originally intended.
But steps to prevent secondary use do not need to be of a technical nature.
For instance, having good contracts with users regulating how the informa-
tion gathered by the system should be used, can also help.
The new fare collection system in Oslo mentioned earlier seems to store far
more information about a user than what should be necessary. The reasons
for storing all the information are to avoid disputes about the amount of
money left on the cards, and to be able to re-issue cards in case one is lost.
But if an insider knows your name, he or she is able to get a complete list of
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your recent travels, something that is not very privacy enhancing.
Distribution
The personal information collected by any system should not be made avail-
able to third parties without prior consent from the data subject.
If a system enforces this control, it assures the data subjects that their
information will not be shared with third parties, and thus enable people
to have a certain degree of control over who has access to their records.
For anyone to claim that their system offers a high degree of privacy, it has
to employ measures to prevent the distribution of personal information. In
Chapter 2, we saw that most definitions regarding information privacy one
way or another included the ability to selectively disclose information about
oneself to others. If an organization collects personal information about
people and willingly shares it with others, either free or as a paid service,
they rob the data subjects of their right to privacy.
Distortion
Operators of a system should do their best to assure the integrity of the in-
formation system.
Steps should be taken to ensure that the data is protected against different
forms of distortion, both unintentional changes stemming from errors, and
malicious attacks to change the information. At the very least, such changes
should not be allowed to occur without detection.
An example of how dangerous such distortion can be was illustrated dur-
ing a red team exercise in 1998. In computer security, a common way of
doing penetration testing of systems is to use a red team, blue team ap-
proach. The blue team is supplied with information about the system while
the red team is not, and they are then both tasked with compromising the
system [40]. During the exercise in 98, the red team was able to compro-
mise a Department Of Defense (DoD) website containing personnel records
and found themselves able to alter the blood type of soldiers. Although the
system they exploited was merely a demonstration system, the potential of
distortion in mission-critical systems, whether deliberate or erroneous, should
be clear [41, 42].
Correction
Any individual whom the system stores personal information about should be
able to access and correct data concerning self.
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For any system, a good description of what information the system col-
lects should be available, but it should also be possible for users to see what
information the system has about themselves, and if the information is wrong
correct it. So, for systems maintaining personal information there should be
routines in place ensuring that such actions are possible. In Norway, compa-
nies that maintain personal information are obliged to provide the following
information upon inquiry [20, §18]:
• Name and address of those responsible for storing and maintaining the
information.
• Why the information is being gathered.
• A description of the information that is used.
• Where the information was collected from.
• Whether or not the information will be shared and to whom.
• If you are registered, you are entitled to know what data is registered
about you.
• Which safeguards are in place, as long as publicizing information about
the safeguards does not reduce the security.
In addition, the same law includes a paragraph requiring those that main-
tain personal information to correct obvious errors, as well as errors pointed
out by those registered [20, §27]. Care has to be taken as wrongly corrected
information can also have negative consequences.
Notification
In the case of a mishap the users whose personal information was leaked and,
perhaps, misused should be informed of the incident.
When a company has experienced a breach in a system, it should notify
the users potentially affected by the breach. The reason for giving such
notification is simply that if someone looses your information you should be
aware of it. Being aware that your personal information has been lost enables
you to prepare for consequences that might follow from such a breach. For
instance, if the intruders get hold of information that enables them to carry
out some kind of identity theft, you can be on the alert and take some
precautions. Depending on where in the world you live there are some steps
that can be taken to reduce this risk. In Norway, it is possible to instruct the
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credit rating companies not to give credit-ratings unless they are supplied a
specific password.
Although giving notice can probably be considered as the right thing
to do, many companies are reluctant to do so. The main reason for this
is probably all the bad press that follows from it. Recently, the American
company Heartland, an electronic payment processing company, went public
with a breach that happened at the end of 2008. At least they went public,
but they choose to do it on the day of president Obama’s inauguration,
and one can only speculate whether it was a strategic move to avoid media
attention.
After 2003, several states in the US have introduced disclosure laws that
require businesses to report breaches in a timely manner if personal informa-
tion has been lost, is expected to have been lost, or acquired by unauthorized
agents. Some states even require that those affected is to be addressed in
writing.
3.3 Privacy Management
With inspiration from risk management and the various Privacy Impact As-
sessment examples mentioned in Chapter 2, the rest of this Chapter will give
the reader an overview of how to use the proposed controls to evaluate the
overall informational privacy offered by a specific system.
A general privacy review of a system will start by getting a good overview
of the system in order to document how it is intended to work, or how it
works. It is especially important to get a full description of how data flows
around in the system, mapping out how it is collected, how it is stored, what
it is used for and so on, describing the full life cycle of personal information
in the system.
When a complete overview of the system has been acquired, the next
step is to determine which of the controls introduced in Section 3.2 are ap-
plicable to the system. One can imagine cases where some of the controls
do not come into use, for instance in systems where one has to keep people
accountable for their actions it may not make sense to talk about the two
controls regarding anonymity. The next step would then be to walk through
the relevant controls, giving a thorough description of the relevant system
parts for each of them and ending with a summary.
In the following sections we will go through all the steps and give a brief
overview of what they should contain.
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3.4 System Overview
When performing a privacy analysis of a system there are many interests and
boundary conditions that have to be considered. So, getting a good overview
of the system, what is actually does, what it is intended to do, and why, are
all important.
Since we are mainly interested in personal information, the overview of the
system should focus on how such information is treated. I earlier mentioned
the information life cycle, and using this as a starting point is a good idea.
Figure 3.4 an illustration of how one might think of the life of pieces of data.
This figure shows that the initial data is collected from some source, then
goes through an initial processing, before it is transfered to storage where it
resides until it is used. In some cases the information in a system might be
shared internally with other systems within the organization, or it might be
shared externally for some reason. Finally, after a certain amount of time,
the information may be deleted from the system.
Figure 3.4: A illustration of how information generally flows through a sys-
tem.
3.4.1 Metrics
The analysis attempts to measure the level of privacy in a system, thus some
kind of metric is needed. Based on the earlier discussion of quantitative and
qualitative risk management, I suggest that such a metric should be based
on a one-dimensional High-Medium-Low quantification. Risk management
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usually uses a 2-dimensional matrix as described in Section 3.1.3, and illus-
trated in Figure 3.3, this is due to the traditional view of risk as likelihood
times impact. When evaluating privacy in computer systems, one tries to
determine the level of privacy in the system and thus solely concentrates on
the level of privacy and not the likelihood that privacy is breached.
It should be noted that the suggested privacy review somewhat overlaps
with a risk management process, but they do not completely overlap and
thus neither one should be seen as an replacement for the other. A risk
management process focuses on preparing for incidents that may occur in
the future and takes steps to ensure that the consequences of such incidents
are as small as possible, while a privacy review focuses on determining how
well privacy is taken care of in a system and highlights areas where problems
reside. As a result I suggest that the individual controls should be given a
High, Medium or Low rating dependent on how good the system protects
privacy. An example of how the different levels should be used is given in
Figure 3.5.
For the metric to be useful to anyone, care must be taken when the
criterion for rating a control High, Medium, or Low are chosen. As the
criteria for each level is set by those performing the process, it is possible to
adjust them to make a system appear more privacy preserving than it really
is. One way to counter this is to make the criteria public so that others may
understand the assessments underlying the final privacy ratings. Personally,
I believe that the high level should be considered as a nearly impossible goal,
only to be used in cases where the system does a very good job of protecting
people’s privacy.
3.5 Analysis of Controls
Having completed the system overview, one should start analyzing the con-
trols. For each of the controls one should start by determining if the control
is applicable for the system in question or not, and if not the reason for this
should be documented. Another special case may arise if those carrying out
the review do not have enough information about a specific control. If there
is no information the entire control should be marked as missing, stating
that very little about it is known and that it should be rated low. If some
information is available, it may be possible to carry out the evaluation, but
the lack of information should be duly noted in the review. After completing
the review of a particular control, one should try to determine the level of
privacy offered from low to high. This involves setting some clear criterions
for the different levels. This is needed on a case to case basis as every system
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Figure 3.5: An illustration of the High, Medium and Low privacy levels.
is different, and to determine some generic requirements that can be used on
every conceivable system is at the very best difficult, not to say impossible.
Many of the issues addressed in the different controls are also subjected to
legislation in some countries, and it would be beneficial to include a discus-
sion of whether or not the system complies with this legislation.
In the end one should have a good system overview and a thorough expla-
nation of how personal information and/or anonymity is treated throughout
the system and an understanding as to what level the different controls are
satisfied. This review should again enable the organization to prioritize the





The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind blow through it; the
storms may enter; the rain may enter — but the King of England cannot
enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
Parliamentarian William Pitt during a speech in 1763
In the previous Chapters we have been given an introduction to privacy
and a structured approach to reviewing the privacy of a system maintaining
personal information was outlined. The purpose of this Chapter is to apply
the method outlined to a real information system, as an example of how it
could be done.
In Norway the government is soon to decide whether to implement the Eu-
ropean Data Retention Directive or not. This directive mandates prolonged
storage of traffic data, but not content. It is fairly simple to imagine how
content of communication data might be used, or misused. But how traffic
data might be used, and what it actually is, is somewhat more difficult to
grasp.
As a result, I have chosen to look closer at the privacy of personal infor-
mation in Norwegian cellphone systems, and especially on traffic data. One
thing that is particularly interesting about such data in the cellphone system,
is that they incorporate the geographic position of the mobile station at the
time it receives or sends data.
The Chapter starts with an introduction to the most relevant entities in
a generic cellphone system. It then continues to describe how geolocalisation
of a cellphone can be carried out. This section of the chapter also contains
information about a simple piece of software that I wrote to exemplify how
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geolocalisation can be done. The last section contains the actual review of
how personal information is handled. Readers should note that the review
is largely carried out with information publicly available, and is done on a
general level, as opposed to look at one particular provider. Although, under
some of the controls, examples from different providers are given. It should
again be stressed that this review is made with the information available to
me at the time, and that if I had been given more information the rating
might have been different.
4.1 Cellphone System Overview
The Global System for Mobile communications (GSM) is the dominant stan-
dard for cellphone communication in the world today, and the system used
in Norway. GSM as a standard was developed during the 1980s, and the
first GSM release came in 1991. Since 91 it has undergone many revisions,
incorporating new functionality and improving old. When released, it was
considered the second generation of cellphone systems, while all the older
analogue systems were labelled first generation. After some years, with the
growth of the Internet, the need for improved transfer speeds of data be-
came clear. In order to increase the transfer rates, the General Radio Packet
Service (GPRS) was developed for use with GSM and other similar 2G sys-
tems, as an add-on. The combination of GSM and GPRS was considered a
stop-gap effort on the way to new 3G systems, and was labelled 2.5G.
The 3G system deployed in Norway today is the Universal Mobile Telecom-
munications System (UMTS). UMTS was derived from GSM with GPRS and
is thus backwards compatible, allowing for a gradual replacement of the old
network infrastructure. All these systems are introduced here because GSM
is the standard that lies at the bottom of most cellphone networks today,
and with UMTS under deployment in the most profitable areas. Figure 4.1
illustrates the key elements in a phone network, where GSM and UMTS are
deployed alongside each other.
As a general rule, both systems can be divided into three similar sub-
systems, although they have different names. For GSM these are the Net-
work Switching Subsystem (NSS), Base Station Subsystem (BSS), and User
Equipment (UE). In UMTS the NSS equivalent is named Core Network (CN),
UMTS Terrestrial Access Subsystem (UTRAN) is the UMTS version of the
BSS, while the User Equipment (UE) is the same in both standards.
In the following, I give a brief description of the elements in these sys-
tems, as an understanding of how the systems work is needed to explain how
personal information is generated and how it flows around in the systems.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of GSM/UMTS architecture.
4.1.1 User Equipment
A UE is a device used by an individual to connect to the network. Usually
this is a cellphone, but it may just as well be a dedicated modem used for
connecting to the Internet via the phone network. Such devices are thought of
as consisting of two parts, the first one is the handset, or modem, itself called
a Mobile Station (MS) while the other one is a (Umts) Subscriber Identity
Module ((U)SIM) card. USIM for UMTS, and SIM for GSM. The cards are
the property of the network operators and contain the necessary information
for subscribers to authenticate themselves to the network. Each card has
a unique number, called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI),
which is 15 digits long. In addition, the card contains an authentication key
that it shares with the authentication center of the owning company. They
also contain some other keys and numbers, as well as storage capacity for a
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phonebook and Short Message Service (SMS) messages.
During the last two decades cellphones have evolved from simple phones
to mobile computers with built-in phone functionality. Phones with function-
ality that resembles a home computer is referred to as a smartphone. In 2008,
smartphones really hit the marked, Apple released their iPhone 3G, Google’s
mobile phone operating system Android hit the market, and other cellphone
vendors released new “pro”-models. These phones often come with chips
supporting a variety of technologies such as Bluetooth, Wireless Networking
(WiFi), and the Global Positioning System(GPS).
4.1.2 Base Station Subsystem/UTRAN
In the GSM and UMTS standards, the part of the infrastructure responsible
for handling signalling and traffic between UE and the telephone network
are given different names. But both contain essentially the same equipment,
although in different versions, and have similar responsibilities. In GSM the
radio towers are called Base Transceiver Station (BTS) while in UMTS they
are named node B, see Figure 4.2. Each tower is connected to a unit that
manages one or more towers simultaneously, in GSM such units are named
Base Station Controller (BSC) while in UMTS they are called Radio Network
Controller (RNC). An illustration of the structure of these can also be found
in Figure 4.2.
BTS/ node B
As stated, BTS and node B are basically radio towers with senders and
receivers, providing the wireless link between the cabled telephone system
and the UE. A tower is equipped with one or more directional antennas,
each responsible for the signalling in one “cell,” hence the name. In GSM
the radio band is divided up into channels, and each such channel can only
carry eight concurrent conversations. So, if an entire city was to be covered
by just one cell, only eight conversations would be possible at any time. In
order to combat this problem the size of cells are reduced, and the number
of cells is increased, taking care that no neighboring cells are using the same
radio frequencies. Each cell is given an ID that is unique under the BSC
controlling the tower. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2, where each color
represents a different channel, and the cell ID is a four digit hexadecimal
number. For simplicity, whenever I consider a radio tower in the rest of this
thesis I will just write BTS, but it could just as well be a Node B.
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Figure 4.2: A simplified illustration of a BTS/Node B. The cell colors indicate
frequencies and the texts are sample cell IDs.
Base Station Controller (BSC) / Radio Network Controller (RNC)
The BSC, or RNC, is a central unit connected to one or more radio towers
and is the governing part of the radio networks in both standards. The main
responsibilities are radio channel allocation and management of handovers
between cells that are under their management. In addition, these units
are responsible for merging multiple connections together and multiplexing
them onto the channel to the Mobile Switching Center (MSC), as illustrated
in Figure 4.1.
4.1.3 Core Network
The core network of a cellphone system is responsible for moving traffic from
the switched telephone network onto the wireless network, and vice versa. In
order to carry out these tasks, it needs to do a lot of bookkeeping, and every
network maintains several registers and centers for bookkeeping purposes. I
will now introduce two such registers used by the MSC, since they will turn
out to be important to the privacy evaluation.
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Home Location Register (HLR)
Every cellphone operator maintains a Home Location Register (HLR) con-
taining detailed information about every subscriber. The database contains
much of the same information as the customers’ (U) SIM-cards. The most
important use of this information is as part in the authentication process of
subscribers. The HLR also stores the subscribers current position in the net-
work. Every time a cellphone transfers from one cell to another, a location
update message is sent to the subscribers HLR. Information about where the
subscriber is located is used for routing calls and messages. When a call to
a cellphone is placed, it is forwarded to the operator of that number. The
operator then forwards the call to the HLR the call is addressed to, the HLR
checks to see where the phone is located in the network, and forwards the call
onto the correct BSC/RNC, which in turn connects it to the correct tower
and the correct cell.
Visitor Location Register (VLR)
In the same way every MSC has a HLR, it also maintains a similar database
of cellphones that have roamed into its area from other service providers. The
Visitor Location Register (VLR) maintains information about the HLRs of
all visitors, and use their HLRs to get authentication data, and for billing.
As with the HLR, the VLR database is important when routing traffic to
and from the UE.
4.2 Geolocalisation of Mobile Stations
This section gives the reader a general introduction to different methods
available to determine the geographic position of a MS. It also includes a
brief description of a Midlet I wrote to examplify geolocalisation from the
MS using information from the cellphone network.
Simple Cell ID
The simplest way of approximating the position of a MS from the network is
to determine which BTS it is currently connected to. Combining this with
information about the geographical placement of the BTS, gives a general
idea of which area the phone is currently located in. As earlier described,
each BTS usually serves multiple cells. In most configurations directional
antennas are used, so that each cell cover a directional cone, and not 360
degrees, typically a configuration utilizes three or six sectors. If one has
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Cell type and coverage area.
Cell type Antenna location Cell Radius (km)
Large macrocell Above rooftop level 3-30
Small macrocell Above rooftop level 1-3
Microcell Below or about rooftop level 0.1-1
Picocell Below rooftop level 0.01-1
Nanocell Below rooftop level 0.001-0.0.1
Table 4.1: List over different cell types and their approximate area of cover-
age. The table was found in [43].
information about which cell the MS is connected to, where the radio tower
is located, and the direction of the antenna, one can further determine an
approximate position of the MS. A major problem with localization based on
cell ID alone, is that the area covered by a cell can range from a small indoor
area to an area with a 35 km radius. Table 4.2 lists different cell types and
their typical size.
The cell ID serving the cellphone is the basis used by Google Mobile
Maps to pinpoint the location of users who does not have a GPS chip in
their phone. As a part of my thesis, I wrote a simple J2ME Midlet for my
cellphone that fetched the information about where my phone was getting its
service from. The Midlet fetches the Mobile Country Code (MCC) indicating
the country I am in, the Mobile Network Code (MNC) giving information
about the network operator, Location Are Code (LAC) indicating the area
you are in, and the cell ID of the current cell. The sample Midlet is included
in Appendix A, while a screen shot of the application is seen in Figure 4.3.
The numbers gathered from the phone is worthless without some more
information about where the tower serving the specified cell is located. When
I started working on my Midlet in the autumn of 2007, I could not find
any such information, as the exact position of radio towers and which cells
they are serving was considered secret by the Norwegian telephone network
operators. But as Google released Mobile Maps, they obviously had access
to the information. The API they used for determining the approximate
position of a phone was soon reverse engineered, and released on the Internet.
Using a simple php script, also included in Appendix A, I was able to use
the Midlet and fetch an approximate latitude and longitude for the phone.
Timing Advance and Cell ID
Timing Advance (TA) is a GSM and UMTS network variable that is used to
measure the time a signal uses from a BTS, to a cellphone and back again.
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Figure 4.3: A screenshot of the Midlet fetching network information from a
mobile phone.
In theory, TA could be used to calculate the distance between the BTS and
a given cellphone. The problem with TA in GSM networks, however, is that
the time is represented as a value between 0 and 63, with one step of this
value representing roughly 3.69 microseconds. In this time a radio signal
travels 1100 meters. Since TA measures round time we have to divide 1100
by two, giving TA a resolution of 550 meters. So assuming TA starts at 1,
a TA value of 1 places the cellphone somewhere between 0 and 550 meters
from the radio tower. A value of 2 places it between 550 and 1100 meters
from the tower etc. Not very accurate when trying to determine where in the
city you are currently located. UMTS employs a different radio technology,
and has a better implementation of TA, resulting in a theoretical resolution
of 35 meters, but according to [44] the resolution is much worse in practise.
Triangulation techniques
Various methods may be used to triangulate an object that emits a signal
by observing the received signal from different places.
One such method is Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA). When using
TDOA, the time of arrival of a specific signal is measured at different BTSs,
the difference in this time between the base stations is used to determine the
position of a MS. By looking at TDOA, the distance from one base to the MS
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can be expressed as an hyperbolic. When several hyperbolas are calculated
the intersection between them will reveal the approximate position of the
MS.
Another triangulation technique is Angel of Arrival (AOA), a method
where special antennas placed at the BTS are used to determine the angle
of an incoming signal. By calculating multiple such angles and knowing the
antennas’ positions, the MS is located by “drawing” a line from each antenna
in the calculated angle and looking at the intersection of these lines.
In addition, one could also imagine triangulation done with TA from
three or more base stations. Using the TA value we get a radius from each
BTS, and by drawing circles with these radiuses the MS is probably located
somewhere inside the intersection of these circles.
But neither of these methods are applicable without adding expensive
equipment to the network, so they are not much used in practice.
Global Positioning System
GPS is a positioning system based on satellites orbiting the earth, emitting
radio signals. GPS enabled devices can receive this signal from satellites in
sight and use it do calculate its position. This calculation is done by looking
at the intersection of spheres.
As stated several high end phones also include a GPS chip. One major
drawback of GPS however, is that it does not work well in urban areas,
because it requires a line of sight to the satellites. In addition GPS can only
be used from the handset, unless the phones come with functionality that
allows the network to query them for location information.
Wireless Thumbprint
Many phones on the market today come with a WiFi chip, enabling them
to use local WiFi hotspots for internet connections. Each wireless network
consists of one or more wireless base stations, and each such base station
has a unique address that it broadcasts over the air. The range of such
networks are typically less than a 100 meters, thus knowing the position of
the base station narrows your position down to a relatively small area. An
American company, named Skyhook Wireless, are trying to make business
from the idea by creating a big database with the positions of WiFi base
stations. When a user then wants to determine his position he does a site
survey, discovering nearby wireless networks, combines this with cell ID,
and/or GPS data and sends it off to Skyhook. Skyhook Wireless then does a
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lookup in their database and determines your position. For more information
about this method see [45].
4.3 Privacy Management
Having given an introduction to the most important parts of the GSM/UMTS
systems, and an introduction to geolocalisation, I will now turn to the frame-
work introduced earlier in the thesis. The rest of this Chapter contains a
sample privacy evaluation of GSM and UMTS with respect to traffic data
and location information.
4.3.1 Collection
Any information system should only collect the minimum amount of personal
information that it needs to fulfil its purpose.
The voice and data traffic has to make its way through the networks of the
cellphone system. Although the traffic is encrypted when transmitted over
the air, it travels in the clear through the wired networks. It should also be
noted that the ciphers used to protect GSM have several proven weaknesses
[46], and that commercially available equipment is capable of breaking it in
real time [47].
SMS and MMS traffic are handled differently. Whenever the network
receives a message that is to be delivered, it checks the HLR or the VLR,
depending on where it finds the device. The information from these registers
is used to determine the address of the Short Message Service Center, or the
equivalent for MMS, associated with the recipient, and the system forwards
the message there. The service center is then responsible for delivering the
messages at a later time when the user is available.
Whenever an action that the user has to pay for is performed, whether it
is sending a message, placing a call, or generating data traffic, a Call Detail
Record (CDR) is generated. One thing that might not be as obvious at first,
is that such records are also generated when a device receives traffic. So if
two people are talking to each other using cellphones, a CDR will be recorded
and stored for both of them, not just the one that placed the call. Each CDR
contains at least the following information:
• The number placing the call.
• The number of the recipient.
• Date and time when the call was placed.
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• Duration of the call.
• Type of call (Voice, Data, SMS etc. ).
• The position of the parties (for those of the parties using a cellphone).
When discussing the phone network, it should also be noted that there
are several strong identifiers in the system. A phone number is, necessarily,
a unique identifier. In Norway, and most other countries, the registration
process when buying a subscription aims to achieve a high grade of certainty
that the person is who he claims to be. When buying a subscription one has
to provide an officially approved ID, and the NBN is used to tie the phone
number to a person. Another strong identifier is the International Mobile
Equipment ID (IMEI), the IMEI is a unique 14 or 16 digit number, plus
an additional checksum digit, that identifies each handset ever produced.
Amongst other things, the IMEI number is used to block devices from the
network in the case of a theft, and this number is broadcasted on the network
by the phone. The third unique identifier used is the International Mobile
Subscriber ID, which resides on the (U)SIM card which is used as an interna-
tional identifier for GSM and UMTS subscriptions. So there are two unique
identifiers that are tied to a subscription, and one that is tied to the mobile
station.
To sum everything up, the cellphone networks contain information about
you as a subscriber, they carry your voice and data communication unen-
crypted through their inner networks, SMS and MMS messages are at some
point available in their respective message centers. In addition, they cre-
ate and store CDRs every time you use your phone. There are also quite a
few strong identifiers in the system, all of which are strongly connected with
the subscriber through the initial registration process or to a specific phone
(MS). All of these data points are created and collected in order to make
the system function, and to enable billing of customers. The tight coupling
between subscribers and phone numbers are in place due to regulations from
the government.
As outlined in italics in the beginning of the section, a system should not
store more information than it needs to carry out the tasks it was built for.
The information collected by cellphone systems is in large needed in order
to do billing and network planning. However, I have not found a very good
explanation as to why the geographical position of the user is stored in the
CDRs. As a result, I would rate Collection as medium.
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4.3.2 Retention
Personal information should be retained for the shortest possible period.
The phone companies need to store CDRs in order to do billing, both
towards their own customers, but also in order to charge other companies
for roaming visitors. In addition, traffic data may also be used for network-
planning. So the phone companies obviously need to store CDRs for some
amount of time in order to get paid. Norwegian law mandates that compa-
nies are to delete, or anonymize, such traffic data as soon as they are not
needed for communication or billing purposes, unless otherwise specifically
instructed by law. In any case such information should be deleted within
three months if the subscriber is paying monthly, and after five months if the
subscriber pays every quarter, unless there are special circumstances such as
a dispute or a police investigation, according to the Norwegian Data Inspec-
torate [48].
For pre-paid subscriptions there is no need to store data for billing pur-
poses, data only needs to be stored long enough for the customer to place
a complaint. There have been some speculations that the transition we are
seeing towards different prepaid, or “call as much as you want,” subscrip-
tions is a part of the reason for the introduction of the EU data retention
directive. If traffic data is not needed anymore, then phone companies may
stop storing it, thus ruining an important source of information for law and
intelligence agencies.
For retention I suggest a rating where the criterion for high is as outlined
in italics at the beginning of this section. In order to get a medium rating,
retention times should be slightly longer than strictly needed, but still data
should be deleted on a regular basis. Low should be given in cases where
information is retained for a longer, or even, indefinite amount of time.
In theory, and according to legislation in Norway, the retention time for
meta data about phone activity should be rated as high. The data are only
stored for billing purposes and are to be deleted after three to five months,
depending on the individual payment plan. In practice however the image
seems to be somewhat different. As a part of my research, I contacted my
provider, Chess, to request a printout of my traffic information. During the
correspondence I was informed that such data was available for 150 days back
in time, even though I have a monthly payment plan. Another fellow student
of mine, discovered that he had access to specified bills dating back to 2007
on his cancelled landline account with the Norwegian provider NextGenTel.
When he contacted customer services inquiring why this information had not
been deleted, he got a reply stating that they had no obligation to delete the
information. Puzzled by the reply he contacted the Norwegian Data Inspec-
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torate. They sent us a copy of the concession NextGenTel had for processing
this information, which clearly stated that they were obligated to delete
this information. The Data Inspectorate also contacted NextGenTel and in-
structed the company to implement routines for deleting such information,
and to keep the Inspectorate informed about their process.
So even though I have rated retention as high based on laws and publicly
available information, if I were to do a rating of my provider Chess, they
would fall down to medium, while NextGenTel who obviously do not have
routines for deletion at all would end up with a rating of low. If the data
retention directive is implemented in Norway, I would have rated any system
storing traffic data for more than six months as medium or low, depending
on the storage time; simply because of the dramatic increased amount of
information that would be residing in the system, and the long storage time.
In the worst case, granted that you use your cellphone a few times a day, a
complete map of your movements for the last two years would be available
to anyone with access to your records.
4.3.3 Secondary Use
Collected personal information should only be used for the specific purpose it
was originally collected.
According to the Norwegian Law, any use of CDRs that goes beyond
billing requires an active consent from the subscriber. So here there are good
juridical restrictions on the use of traffic data protecting subscribers from
function creep.
If I were to define the high, medium and low criterions, I would phrase
high as the information is strongly protected against secondary use. Medium
would be for systems where protection against secondary use are present,
but not working in an optimal way. While low would be for systems that
either facilitate secondary use, or do not have good policies or agreements
with with customers concerning their personal information.
From these definitions, the protection against secondary use in the Nor-
wegian telephone system should be rated as high.
4.3.4 Distribution
The personal information collected by any system should not be made avail-
able to third parties without prior consent from the data subject.
As with secondary use, external sharing of information also falls under
the laws requiring the consent of those registered in the system, but there
are some exceptions for emergency services and police investigations. Every
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call that is made to a Norwegian emergency department (police, ambulance,
or fire department) from a cellphone is automatically positioned and the
approximate location of the caller is displayed on a map in front of the op-
erator. Revealing the position of a caller in distress is actually one of the
main reasons why the functionality for locating a MS geographically was de-
veloped, and extended the way it has. Before cellphones, every landline was
tied to a specific address, so the location of the caller was simply a matter of
looking in the phone book. But with the introduction of the cellphone, emer-
gency responders were dependent on the caller to know their location. As
a result governments required the telephone companies to enable geographic
positioning of cellphones.
The police is also granted access to traffic data if they are conducting an
investigation. The only requirement is that they are conducting an investi-
gation and forward a request to the Norwegian Post and Telecoumications
Authority describing their needs, no court ruling is needed [49].
Having built the geolocalisation functionality into the cellphone network,
providers also want to profit from it. By offering other companies access to
the location of mobile devices, providers are able to make money on such
services. Of course, this access is regulated by agreements stating what is
allowed and what is needed in order to determine the position of a MS.
While working on the thesis I contacted one company that I knew had such
an agreement and tried to get more information about it. They said that
in order to trace someone the user had to consent to the tracing before it is
carried out. Further, I asked whether there were any technical functionality
that enforced this rule or if it was just a contractual thing, they did not reply.
If this is in fact the case it opens for an insider threat, where anyone with
access to the tracking functionality are able to track someone without prior
consent.
The information about your position can of course also be disclosed by
software running on your cellphone, as explained and exemplified at the
beginning of this Chapter. Applications such as Google Mobile Maps send the
information about where in the network you are connected when pinpointing
your location. Of course the network providers are not to blame for it, but
it should be noted that with the right software installed on the MS it is
possible to track the MS without involving the phone company. American
law enforcement used malicious software to turn mobile devices into spying
devices according to a news article on CNET [50]. There is even software
commercially available for turning a cellphone into a complete surveillance
tool, allowing everything from remote listening, controlling the phone, and
determining its position. One example of such a software is FlexiSpy [51].
In order to rate as high, it should not be possible for anyone to get hold
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of personal information without prior consent. We have seen that Norwe-
gian legislation in large aligns with this requirement, except in the case of
the police, who are free to collect traffic information related to an investi-
gation. Medium should be used for systems where personal information is
distributed to other parties on a regular basis, but the distribution is well
documented and based on real needs. A rating of low should be given to
systems where prevention, or at least documentation, of information distri-
bution is not present.
Following these guidelines, the personal information maintained in the
cellphone system in Norway gets a rating of medium, due to the fact that
the Norwegian Police can access to traffic data without a court ruling, and
the possible leakage of users positions through insider threats in companies
with B2B agreements about access to location information.
4.3.5 Distortion
Operators of an information system should do their best to assure the integrity
of the system.
The personal information in the cellphone system is largely used for billing
of customers and other telephone companies. As a result, the companies
themselves have good incentives to make sure that information in the system
cannot be manipulated in any way. It is worth noting that messages sent in
the phone system does not provide any checking for integrity, and it is easy
to spoof the sender number if one has access to an SMS gateway. Likewise it
is possible to spoof the caller ID, a hack that was used for listening to Paris
Hilton’s voicemail and to steal her phonebook a few years ago. Doing so was
possible because the voicemail did not have any password, it just checked the
callers number, if there was a voicemail account for that number access was
granted.
In addition, if we agree that traffic data is indeed personal information,
paragraph thirteen in the Norwegian law regulating the processing of per-
sonal information talks about information security. It states that anyone
who processes personal information are to ensure that the system offers an
adequate level of security with regards to confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability through a planed and systematic effort. Further, it states that the
effort should be documented, and the documentation should be made avail-
able to the Data Inspectorate. Although the law does not further specify
what is considered as an adequate level of security.
In order for a system to get rated as high with respect to distortion, the
system has to incorporate security in its design, and the safety measures in
place to protect personal information must be well documented and publicly
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available. Systems should be granted a rating of medium when the efforts
to ensure integrity are not adequately implemented, or not well documented.
Low should be given to systems where efforts to ensure the integrity of per-
sonal information are not present, or left undocumented.
According to these criterions I would give the cellphone system a high
rating when speaking of call-details and position only. If the integrity of
other types of personal information, such as messages and voicemail, were to
be included the rating would probably be lower.
4.3.6 Correction
Any individual about whom the system stores personal information should be
able to access and correct data concerning self.
Since the information is collected automatically in the phone system and
used as the basis for billing, there should be routines in place that allow
customers to complain if they think that their bill is somehow wrong. In
order to place a call using someone’s subscription in a GSM or a UMTS
network one essentially needs two numbers that reside on the (U)SIM card.
However, a smart card is built to be a tamper resistant device that goes
a long way to protect the confidentiality of the information that resides on
them. As to my knowledge there have not yet been mounted any practical
attacks on the current version of these cards that allow an attacker to extract
this information using methods that does not destroy the SIM card.
But no matter how good the technical protection built into the system,
customers should still be able to access the information concerning them-
selves. If the information is erroneous, routines for placing a complaint and
correcting it should be in place. Norwegian telephone operators will give
you access to the information stored in the system about your subscription
if they are addressed in writing by the subscriber. As they are obliged to do
so by the law regulating the use of personal information, as described in the
“Correction” Paragraph in Section 3.2.2.
However after addressing a formal letter to my provider at the time,
which was Chess, asking for information about the security measures, and
a list of traffic data, they replied with a list of incoming traffic and failed
to account for the security measures and to describe what types of personal
information they were processing. Drawing any conclusions based on just one
incident is impossible, but at least my provider seems to have some room for
improvement.
In order for a system to get rated as high there has to be formalized rou-
tines for how to access ones personal information, and how to deliver a com-
plaint, or ask for information to be corrected. While I would rate a system
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where you are still allowed to do these things, but not in a simple and formal-
ized way, as medium. For systems where access to ones personal information
is not granted, the control should be given a rating of low. In Norway any
systems rated below high are, as I see it, in violation with sanctioned laws,
and should implement processes to accommodate the requirements made by
the law.
4.3.7 Notification
In the case of a mishap the users whose personal information was leaked and,
perhaps, misused should be informed of the incident.
When personal information is lost or stolen, then those affected should be
informed so that they may take precautionary steps to protect themselves. I
have tried to find information about how notification would be given on the
public web pages of telephone providers in Norway. But I have not found any
information about how they would handle such an event. So I have chosen
to label this control as missing, since I was not able to find any notification
information, neither did I find anything in the press where phone companies
have warned about leakages. Whether the lack of such stories imply that they
do no exist or that they are not publicly disclosed would only be speculation.
In America, most of the states have sanctioned laws requiring the public
release of information about data breaches. In some states the law requires
that those affected by the breach are informed in writing, stating that a
public disclosure of the breach is not enough. Norway on the other hand
seems so largely ignore data breaches, the law however clearly states that
personal information should not be shared with anyone. Except in the case
where information is collected with the purpose of sharing it, for instance
credit ratings.
4.3.8 Summary
In this Chapter I have done an external review on the privacy of traffic
information in Norwegian cellphone networks. Overall, the information is
granted good protection by the Norwegian law, and it seems that the phone
companies are very much in compliance with regulations when it comes to
meta data about communication and location in general. Figure 5 shows us
that in theory the overall privacy of traffic data is well taken care of. How-
ever, as I have explained when evaluating the different controls, several of
the companies providing services in Norway would get a lower rating if re-
viewed individually; indicating that conducting such a review could increase
the privacy these companies offer their customers. In the case of NextGeTel,
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a review would have detected that they are currently operating in clear vio-
lation of Norwegian law by not deleting the specified bills that they issue to
their customers.





This thesis started by introducing privacy as a concept and argued why pri-
vacy of personal information is important. We saw that certain types of
personal information was considered sensitive, and granted special protec-
tion by the law. In addition, we have seen that the Norwegian law places
restrictions on the use and storage of personal information. So regardless of
whether an organization thinks privacy is important or not, it has to pro-
vide adequate privacy whenever building or maintaining information systems
where personal information is present.
Chapter 3 gave an introduction to risk management. Risk management
was then used as inspiration for a method that could be used to evaluate the
overall privacy in an information system, based on nine different controls.
After the introduction of this method, an example privacy review was carried
out on the cellphone system with focus on traffic and location data. The
review revealed that the privacy of such data is in theory well protected,
but there is still some room for improvement as two controls were labelled
medium and one as missing. Additionally it was discovered that several
telephone providers did not have good routines for deletion of personal data.
A sample Java 2 Micro Edition Midlet was developed to demonstrate
geolocalisation of a mobile phone. The Midlet includes functionality for
approximating the devices position using information gathered from the net-
work along with services from Google, as well as the possibility to push
information about its location to a web server. Thus, enabling a third party
to follow the movements of the device.
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5.2 Subjectivity in Results
It should be noted that the sample evaluation of the cellphone network in
Chapter 4 is based on information freely available and was carried out by
the author alone. If more information had been available, or if others had
joined in on the evaluation, the results may have been different, but it is the
authors view that the conclusions drawn in the evaluation are founded on
the material available and the sources referenced.
When evaluating privacy, as with risk assessments, the best results will
emerge when carried out by a team of individuals with different experiences
and skills.
5.3 Criticism
The framework suggested for evaluating privacy in this thesis is largely based
on work by me and my advisor, and additionally inspired by the American
Privacy Impact Assessments mentioned at the end of Chapter 2. The pre-
sented framework should be viewed as a first attempt to better measure pri-
vacy in information systems. While the reader may question the usefulness
of yet another framework, it is my view that privacy will be an increasingly
important topic in the years to come, and little work is available on how to
actually measure privacy. Hopefully, this will change and we will see a rise
both in techniques developed for preserving privacy in different settings and
places, as well as more research on how to preserve the overall privacy of
systems.
5.4 Conclusions
By using the proposed framework to evaluate parts of the cellphone network,
we were able to identify areas where privacy could be improved. When
looking closer at how different providers were storing their traffic data it
was discovered that at least one of them was operating in clear violation of
their concession, while the other one also seemed to violate their concession,
because they stored data for more time than permitted to. So it seems that
trying to manage privacy by carrying out a structured analyze of a system
would be beneficial both for customers and companies.
When large companies as Chess/NetCom and NetGenTel are found to
break the law by outsiders analyzing their systems it suggests the need for
more privacy analyses of Norwegian companies. Hopefully, in the future we
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will se even more pressure from the Data Inspectorate and others to enforce
privacy laws and regulations. After all laws are useless without compliance.
5.5 Further Work
More work on the controls would probably be beneficial, since only a handful
of individuals have helped in the process of establishing and refining these.
Perhaps it could be possible to determine some general criteria for high,
medium, and low, for use on all systems.
Additionally, applying the method to multiple large systems would prob-
ably be very useful in future refinements. It would also be interesting to do
reviews of how specific telephone providers in Norway are handling traffic
and location data. Research of how much information could be extracted
from two years worth of such records would also be a valuable input to the
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Sample Cell ID Midlet
At the beginning of my work on this thesis I came across an J2ME Appli-
cation Programming Interface (API) from Sony Ericsson that allowed pro-
grammers to fetch information about where in the network the phone was
connected. Using this information, it would be possible to determine the
approximate position of the cellphone, granted one had access to a database
of BTS and Cell ID locations. So to demonstrate how this could be done, I
wrote a sample Midlet fetching this data from the phone and pushing it to a
central server.
At the time, I did not have access to any databases where I could look
up the position of the specific cell, and I discovered that this information
was allegedly considered secret by Norwegian providers. Just a few months
later, Google released their Mobile Maps application, including a feature to
locate phones without GPS chips. I quickly realized that they were using
positioning based in cell ID. In the following sections, I will outline the API
provided by Sony Ericsson, how I used Google to look up the position of
cells, and finally the source code for a simple MIDlet is included.
As a side note, the open source project “OpenCellID” aims at creating a
complete database of mobile cells and their geographical placement [52].
A.1 Sony Ericsson API calls
Below is a short list of the most interesting properties that the Sony Ericsson
Java Platform allows users to fetch using the System.getProperty(” ” ); call.
All the commands work with version 7.3 of Sony Ericsson Java platform,
except for the last two who are only supported in version 8 and later. In-
formation about these, and other, calls can be found in the Sony Ericsson
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Developer Guidelines for the Java Platform, Micro Edition, CLDC - MIDP2
[53].
com.sony Ericsson.net.mcc Used to fetch the home mobile country code
from the phone. For instance in Norway this would be 242.
com.sony Ericsson.net.mnc Used to fetch the home mobile network code.
In Norway 01 is allocated to Telenor, 02 is NetCom. The code is usually
two or three digits long.
com.sony Ericsson.net.cmcc Used to fetch the country code of the net-
work you are currently connected to.
com.sony Ericsson.net.cmnc Fetches the current mobile network core.
com.sony Ericsson.net.isonhomeplmn Returns true or false.
com.sony Ericsson.net.rat Used to determine the Radio Access Technol-
ogy (RAT) currently used ( GSM or WCDMA ).
com.sony Ericsson.net.cell ID Returns the identity of the cell your phone
is currently connected to in hex format. The value is four digits for
GSM networks and eight for WCDMA.
com.sony Ericsson.net.lac Returns the local area code where your phone
is connecting to the network.
com.sony Ericsson.net.serviceprovider Returns the name of the opera-
tor or service provider.
com.sony Ericsson.net.networkname Returns the name of the network
the phone is connected to.
With these calls I was able to fetch all the information that is needed to
geographically locate a device using the simple Cell Id technique described
earlier in this thesis.
A.2 Google Mobile Maps API hack
As stated at he beginning of the Appendix, a database with necessary infor-
mation about cells and their geographical placement was not available when
I wrote the first version of this Midlet. But when Google released their Mo-
bile Maps, I found a discussion on a Google forum, where the users were
attempting to reverse engineer the API used to turn the information about
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where the phone was connected to the phone network into geographical co-
ordinates. After a short period of time, the API call needed to do this was
reverse engineered, and available on the net.
So, using the following php code on a web server i controlled, I was able to
input the needed data and having Google return the latitude and longitude.
$ i n i t p o s = strlen ( $data ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 38]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 0 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 37]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 2 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 36]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 4 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 35]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 6 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 34]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 0 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 33]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 2 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 32]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 4 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 31]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 6 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 24]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $cid , 0 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 23]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $cid , 2 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 22]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $cid , 4 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 21]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $cid , 6 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 20]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $ lac , 0 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 19]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $ lac , 2 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 18]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $ lac , 4 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 17]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $ lac , 6 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 16]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 0 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 15]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 2 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 14]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 4 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 13]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ($mnc , 6 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 12]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 0 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 11]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 2 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 10]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 4 , 2 ) ) ;
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 9]= pack ( ”H∗” , substr ( $mcc , 6 , 2 ) ) ;
i f ( (hexdec ( $c id ) > 0 x f f f f ) && ($ REQUEST [ ”mcc” ] !=
”” ) &&
($ REQUEST [ ”mnc” ] != ”” ) ) {
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 27 ] = chr ( 5 ) ;
} else {
$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 24]= chr ( 0 ) ;
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$data [ $ i n i t p o s − 23]= chr ( 0 ) ;
}
$context = array (
’ http ’ => array (
’method ’ => ’POST ’ ,
’ header ’=>
”Content−type : app l i c a t i on / binary \ r\n”
. ”Content−Length : ” . strlen (
$data ) . ”\ r \n” ,
’ content ’ => $data
)
) ;
$xcontext = s t r e am con t ex t c r e a t e ( $context ) ;
$ s t r=f i le get contents
( ”http ://www. goog le . com/glm/mmap” ,FALSE, $xcontext )
;
$ l a t = ( ( ord ( $ s t r [ 7 ] ) << 24) | (ord ( $ s t r [ 8 ] )
<< 16) | (ord ( $ s t r [ 9 ] ) << 8) | (ord ( $ s t r [ 1 0 ] ) ) )
/ 1000000;
$ lon = ( ( ord ( $ s t r [ 1 1 ] ) << 24) | (ord ( $ s t r [ 1 2 ] )
<< 16) | (ord ( $ s t r [ 1 3 ] ) << 8) | (ord ( $ s t r [ 1 4 ] ) ) )
/ 1000000;
A.3 The Midlet
The Midlet I wrote has two basic functionalities. If the user selects ”Start
pushing” the cellphone will collect information about where it is connected
in the network and push this onto a web server along with the IMEI of
the cellphone. At this web server the information is stored in a database
and can be used in different ways. To illustrate one possible use, a simple
interface displaying the last recorded positions of a phone was implemented,
a screenshot of this is seen in Figure B.1.
When the user selects ”System Info” a screen is displayed for a few seconds
where he is presented with a summary of the network information. If the
user wants to, the phone may also fetch the latitude and longitude from the
internet using the GMM API. A sample screen shot of this is seen in Figure
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Figure A.1: A screenshot from the simple web page written by the author,
as one possible use of the data pushed by the cellphones.
A.3
A.3.1 GeoLocalisationMidlet
This is the Class containing the main menu, and contains the functionality
needed to set up the different screens.
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . l cdu i . Aler t ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . l cdu i .Command ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . l cdu i . CommandListener ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . l cdu i . Display ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . l cdu i . D i sp layab le ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . l cdu i . L i s t ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . midlet . MIDlet ;
import javax . mic ro ed i t i on . midlet .
MIDletStateChangeException ;
/∗∗
∗ The MIDlet c l a s s o f an a p p l i c a t i o n t ha t f e t c h e s
in format ion about network
∗ c onn e c t i v i t y and uses t h i s to determine the
geograph ic p o s i t i o n o f the dev i c e .
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connect to the Internet.
(c) A screen listing
network information
as well at latitude and
longitude.
Figure A.2: Here we see the the different steps needed in order to view the
network information in the Midlet.
∗ I t a l s o suppor t s pushing o f the network
in format ion to a remote server ,
∗ enab l ing t r a c k i n g o f the c e l l p hone s whereabouts .
∗
∗ @author Vidar Drageide
∗
∗/
pub l i c c l a s s Geo l o ca l i s a t i onMid l e t extends MIDlet
implements CommandListener {
pub l i c L i s t menuList ; // Wil l conta in the
main menu
pr i va t e Command selectCommand ; // Command used to
s e l e c t i tems
pr i va t e Display d i sp ; // Hook to the dev i c e





pub l i c Geo l o ca l i s a t i onMid l e t ( ) {
// Fetch the d i s p l a y o f the mobi le dev i c e
di sp = Display . getDisp lay ( t h i s ) ;
// crea te the menu f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n
St r ing [ ] e lements = {” Sta r t pushing ” , ”System
i n f o ” , ”About” , ”Exit ” } ;
menuList = new L i s t ( ”Cel l−Push” , L i s t . IMPLICIT ,
elements , nu l l ) ;
// Add commands
selectCommand = new Command( ”Open” , Command .ITEM
, 1) ;
menuList . setSelectCommand( selectCommand ) ;
menuList . setCommandListener ( t h i s ) ;
// Disp lay the menu l i s t on the screen
di sp . setCurrent ( menuList ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ This method i s c a l l e d when the a p p l i c a t i o n i s
shut down .
∗/
pro t ec t ed void destroyApp ( boolean arg0 ) throws
MIDletStateChangeException {
not i fyDest royed ( ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ This method i s used in the case o f a b l o c k i n g
event from the c e l l p hone
∗ t h a t needs to put the Mid le t a t pause .
∗/




∗ This method i s c a l l e d to s t a r t the a p p l i c a t i o n
a f t e r r e c e i v i n g a
∗ b l o c k i n g c a l l .
∗/




∗ This method i s c a l l e d whenever a command i s
i s s u ed to the mid l e t
∗
∗/
pub l i c vo id commandAction(Command arg0 ,
D isp layab le arg1 ) {
i f ( arg0 . equa l s ( selectCommand ) ){
// Get the index o f the element s e l e c t e d in
the menu
i n t key = menuList . g e tSe l e c t ed Index ( ) ;
t ry {
switch ( key ) {
// 0 − User s e l e c t e d s t a r t push
case 0 : startPush ( ) ; break ;
// 1 − User s e l e c t e d Show system in f o .
case 1 : systemInfo ( ) ; break ;
// 2 − Users s e l e c t s about . Invoke the ”
About”−screen
case 2 : startAbout ( ) ; break ;
// 3 − User wants to e x i t the so f tware
case 3 : destroyApp ( t rue ) ; break ;





catch ( Exception e ) {





∗ Method tha t i s used to s e t up e v e r y t h i n g needed
f o r pushing in format ion
∗ to the web−s e r v e r .
∗/
pr i va t e void startPush ( ) {
System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ” Sta r t ing to push in fo rmat ion
to s e r v e r ” ) ;
IdPush pusher ;
Thread pushThread ;
pusher = new IdPush ( th i s , d i sp ) ;
t ry {
pushThread = new Thread ( pusher ) ;
pushThread . s t a r t ( ) ;
}
catch ( Nul lPo interExcept ion e ) {




∗ This method i s invoked when the user p r e s s e s ”
System Info ”
∗ The method f e t c h e s a l l the in format ion t ha t i s
to be d i s p l a y ed and
∗ f e t c h e s l a t i t u d e and l on g i t ud e from the
In t e rn e t .
∗ The screen goes away by i t s e l f 10 seconds a f t e r
answering yes
∗ or no to ” grant I n t e rn e t access ” d i a l o gue .
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∗/
pr i va t e void systemInfo ( ) {
System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ” Sta r t ing SystemInfo Screen ” )
;
Aler t a l e r t = new Aler t ( ”About MIDP” ) ;
a l e r t . setTimeout ( Aler t .FOREVER) ;
S t r ing imei = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . imei ” ) ;
S t r ing c e l l ID = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . c e l l ID” ) ;
S t r ing l a c = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . l a c ” ) ;
S t r ing mcc = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . cmcc” ) ;
S t r ing mnc = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . cmnc” ) ;
/∗
∗ Fetch l a t i t u d e and l on g i t ud e us ing php−code
on a s e r v e r
∗/
GeoFetcher a = new GeoFetcher ( t h i s ) ;
a . setCID ( c e l l ID) ;
a . setLAC( l a c ) ;
a . setMCC(mcc) ;
a . setMNC(”2” ) ;
a . setAl ( a l e r t ) ;
a . setDisp ( d i sp ) ;
/∗
∗ Whenever the MIDlet needs access to the
network
∗ the phone opens a d i a l o g query ing the user
whether
∗ to a l l ow t h i s or not .
∗ To avoid a dead lock t h i s process shou ld be
separa ted in to
∗ a own thread .
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∗/
Thread sjekkeThread = new Thread ( a ) ;
sjekkeThread . s t a r t ( ) ;
// While we are wa i t ing f o r the p o s i t i o n we
d i s p l a y the i n f o we have
a l e r t . s e t S t r i n g ( ”IMEI : ” +imei + ”\n” + ” Ce l l
ID : ” + c e l l ID + ”\n”
+ ”LAC : ” + la c + ”\nMCC : ” + mcc + ”\n” + a
. l o c a t i o n ) ;
d i sp . setCurrent ( a l e r t ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Method tha t invoke s the ”About”−screen .
∗ This i s j u s t a t r e a l l y s imp le about screen .
∗/
pr i va t e void startAbout ( ) {
// Create an a l e r t
Aler t a l e r t = new Aler t ( ”About MIDP” ) ;
// Disp lay i t u n t i l the user c l i c k s ”Done”
a l e r t . setTimeout ( Aler t .FOREVER) ;
// Fetch the d i s p l a y
Display d i sp l a y= Display . getDisp lay ( t h i s ) ;
// SEt up and d i s p l a y the a l e r t
a l e r t . s e t S t r i n g ( ”CellIDPush \nWritten by : Vidar
Drageide ” +
”\nwww. drage ide . com ” ) ;




This class implements a simple push functionality. It collects and remembers
the latest cell ID’s and the time where the phone was last connected. When-
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ever the class detects that the phone has roamed into a new cell it does a
get-request to a web server. This request sends information about the phone
IMEI, current cell ID, and time to the server.
package com . drage ide . g e o l o c a l i s a t i o n . Cel lIDPusher ;
( Imports removed )
pub l i c c l a s s IdPush implements Runnable{
pr i va t e i n t CELLMEMORY = 10 ;
// Parent MIDlet , used f o r f e t c h i n g the main menu
i f need be
pr i va t e Geo l o ca l i s a t i onMid l e t parent ;
// Hook to the d i s p l a y o f the dev i c e
pr i va t e Display d i sp ;
p r i va t e Form page ;
// Array f o r s t o r i n g l o c a t i o n data .
pr i va t e Pos i t i on [ ] l o c ;
// S t r ing used f o r s t o r i n g data ;
pr i va t e St r ing cu r r en tCe l l ;
p r i va t e St r ing imei ;
// Exi t and back commands .
pr i va t e f i n a l Command EXIT CMD = new Command( ”Exit
” , Command .EXIT , 2) ;
p r i va t e f i n a l Command BACKCMD = new Command( ”Back
” , Command .BACK, 1) ;
/∗∗
∗ Constructor .
∗ @param d re f e r en c e to the parent mid l e t .
∗ @param d i sp hook to the d i s p l a y o f the dev i c e
∗/
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pub l i c IdPush ( Geo l o ca l i s a t i onMid l e t d , Display
d i sp ){
t ry {
l o c = new Pos i t i on [CELLMEMORY] ;
t h i s . parent = d ;
t h i s . d i sp = disp ;
t h i s . imei = System . getProperty ( ”com .
sonye r i c s s on . imei ” ) ;
imei = imei . sub s t r i ng (5 ) ;
}
catch ( Exception e ) {
// TODO: handle excep t i on




∗ As the a c t i on s performed here r e qu i r e s I n t e rn e t
connection , they have to
∗ be separa ted in to a thread in order to avoid
dead l ock s .
∗/
pub l i c vo id run ( ) {
t h i s . cu r r en tCe l l = System . getProperty ( ”com .
sonye r i c s s on . net . c e l l i d ” ) ;
i f ( cu r r en tCe l l == nu l l ){
/∗




cu r r en tCe l l = ”No Ce l l Ava i l ab l e ” ;
}
newCell ( cu r r en tCe l l ) ;
t ry {
// ge t the current c e l l I d from the phone
whi l e ( t rue ){
St r ing newCell =
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System . getProperty ( ”com . sonye r i c s s on . net .
c e l l i d ” ) ;
i f ( newCell == nu l l ) {
newCell = ”Error ” ;
System . out . p r i n t ( ”Could not get c e l l ID \n”
) ;
}
i f ( newCell . compareTo ( cu r r en tCe l l ) != 0 ){
// we ’ ve moved in to a new c e l l and need
to update the page and the t a b l e
newCell ( newCell ) ;
cu r r en tCe l l = newCell ;
}
Thread . s l e ep (15000) ;
}
}
catch ( Exception e ) {
// TODO: handle excep t i on




∗ This method i s to be invoked every time the
phone moves from one
∗ c e l l to another . The method r e f r e s h e s the l i s t
o f v i s i t e d c e l l s ,
∗ and informs the web−s e r v e r about i t s new
l o c a t i o n by c a l l i n g
∗ sentHttpGet ( ) .
∗ @param c e l l
∗/
pr i va t e void newCell ( S t r ing c e l l ) {
// move a l l the o ther c e l l s one down
f o r ( i n t i = l o c . length−1 ; i > 0 ; i−−){
l o c [ i ] = l o c [ i −1] ;
}
// Create a new Pos i t ion−o b j e c t and put i t a t
index [ 0 ]
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Pos i t i on now = new Pos i t i on ( ) ;
// put in the new one at index 0 o f the l i s t
l o c [ 0 ] = now ;
// make a form and p lace a l l the t e x t
page = new Form( ” Ce l l s v i s i t e d ” ) ;
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < l o c . l ength ; i++){
i f ( l o c [ i ] != nu l l )
page . append ( l o c [ i ] . t oSt r ing ( ) ) ;
e l s e
page . append ( ”Not recorded” ) ;
}
page . addCommand(BACKCMD) ;
page . addCommand(EXIT CMD) ;
page . setCommandListener (new CommandListener ( ) {
pub l i c vo id commandAction(Command arg0 ,
D isp layab le arg1 ) {
i f ( arg0 . equa l s (EXIT CMD) ) {
parent . not i fyDest royed ( ) ;
}
e l s e i f ( arg0 . equa l s (BACKCMD) ) {




// put the form in the d i s p l a y a b l e area ’
di sp . setCurrent ( page ) ;
// send a post−r e que s t to the t r a c i n g s e r v e r
// prepare r e que s t t h a t pushes our pos i t i on−
in format ion onto the s e r v e r . . . .
St r ing u r l = ”http :// f r i b y t e . uib . no/˜ vidar /
pusher /pushHandle . php? imei=”+ imei
+ ”&c id=” + now . getCid ( )
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+ ”&time=” + now . getTime ( ) . getTime ( )
+ ”&la c=” + now . getLac ( )
+ ”&mcc=” + now . getMcc ( )
+ ”&mnc=” + now . getMnc ( ) ;
S t r ing r e s u l t S t r =”” ;
char tmpChar ;
// Make sure the s t r i n g i s a v a l i d u r l :
f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < ur l . l ength ( ) ; i++){
tmpChar = ur l . charAt ( i ) ;
switch ( tmpChar ) {
case ’ ’ : r e s u l t S t r+=( ”+” ) ;
break ;




// send the r e s u l t to the s e r v e r us ing a ge t
r e que s t
sendHttpGet ( r e s u l t S t r ) ;
}
/∗∗
∗ Method tha t does an ge t r e que s t to a s e r v e r .
∗ In e f f e c t i t pushes in format ion about where the
dev i c e i s connected
∗ to the network to the s e r v e r .
∗/
pr i va t e void sendHttpGet ( St r ing u r l ) {
HttpConnection httpConn = nu l l ;
t ry {
httpConn = ( HttpConnection ) Connector . open ( u r l
) ;
httpConn . setRequestMethod ( HttpConnection .GET) ;
httpConn . setRequestProperty ( ”User−Agent” ,
” P r o f i l e /MIDP−1.0 Con f i r gura t i on /CLDC−1.0” ) ;
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i n t respCode = httpConn . getResponseCode ( ) ;
/∗
∗ Check whether the r e que s t succeeded or not
and l e t the
∗ user know by showing an a l e r t .
∗/
i f ( respCode == HttpConnection .HTTP OK) {
Aler t a l e r t = new Aler t ( ”OK” ) ;
a l e r t . setTimeout ( Aler t .FOREVER) ;
a l e r t . s e t S t r i n g ( ”Pushed data” ) ;
d i sp . setCurrent ( a l e r t ) ;
}
e l s e {
Aler t a l e r t = new Aler t ( ”Error ” ) ;
a l e r t . setTimeout ( Aler t .FOREVER) ;
a l e r t . s e t S t r i n g ( ” e r r o r ” ) ;
d i sp . setCurrent ( a l e r t ) ;
}
httpConn . c l o s e ( ) ;
}
catch ( Exception e ) {
Aler t a l e r t = new Aler t ( ”Error ” ) ;
a l e r t . setTimeout ( Aler t .FOREVER) ;
a l e r t . s e t S t r i n g ( ”There was an e r r o r pushing
data” ) ;
d i sp . setCurrent ( a l e r t ) ;





This class is responsible for fetching the information needed for the “System
Information” screen. It basically collects the information from the device us-
ing the API calls earlier described and displays them as an alert. In addition,
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this class has implemented the functionality needed to fetch the latitude and
longitude from my web server using the php script above.
package com . drage ide . g e o l o c a l i s a t i o n . Cel lIDPusher ;
( Imports removed )
c l a s s GeoFetcher implements Runnable{
// The address o f the web−page r e c i e v i n g and
hand l ing the lookup o f l a t / lon
St r ing se rve rAdre s s = ”http ://www. f r i b y t e . uib . no/˜
vidar /pusher /pushTest . php” ;
S t r ing CID ;
St r ing MNC ;
St r ing MCC ;
St r ing LAC ;
St r ing l o c a t i o n ;
Display d i sp ;
Aler t a l ;
p r i va t e Geo l o ca l i s a t i onMid l e t parentMidlet ;
/∗
∗ Constructor . T r i v i a l .
∗/
pub l i c GeoFetcher ( Geo l o ca l i s a t i onMid l e t parent ){
t h i s . parentMidlet = parent ;
}
/∗
∗ Getters and s e t t e r s removed as they conta in
noth ing s p e c i a l
∗/
/∗∗
∗ Method tha t sends a get−r e que s t to a web−s e r v e r
who uses the parameters
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∗ to determine the apprixomate p o s i t i o n o f the
mobi le dev i c e .
∗
∗ @return A s t r i n g with the r e s u l t o f the query
or throws an excep t i on .
∗/
pr i va t e St r ing getFromUrl ( ) {
// Add the get−parameters to the r e que s t .
s e rve rAdre s s = se rve rAdre s s +”? c id=” + CID + ”&
la c=” + LAC + ”&mcc=”
+ MCC +”&mnc=”+ MNC ;
// Print the adress f o r debugg ing purposes
System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( s e rve rAdre s s ) ;
// Set up connec t ions and b u f f e r s
StreamConnection sc = nu l l ;
InputStream i o s = nu l l ;
S t r i ngBu f f e r sBuf f = new St r i ngBu f f e r ( ) ;
t ry {
sc = ( StreamConnection ) Connector . open (
se rve rAdre s s ) ;
i o s = sc . openInputStream ( ) ;
i n t ch ;
whi l e ( ( ch= i o s . read ( ) ) != −1 ) {
sBuf f . append ( ( char ) ch ) ;
}
return sBuf f . t oSt r ing ( ) ;
} catch ( Exception e ) {
System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”” +
”Error whi l e f e t ch i ng data from web−s e r v e r ” ) ;





∗ Since t h i s shou ld be run in a sepe ra te thread
we need a run () method .
∗
∗/
pub l i c vo id run ( ) {
l o c a t i o n = getFromUrl ( ) ;
a l . s e t S t r i n g ( a l . g e tS t r i ng ( ) + l o c a t i o n ) ;
a l . setCommandListener ( parentMidlet ) ;
d i sp . setCurrent ( a l ) ;
t ry {
Thread . s l e ep (5000) ;
} catch ( Inter ruptedExcept ion e ) {
// TODO Auto−genera ted ca tch b l o c k
e . pr intStackTrace ( ) ;
}
di sp . setCurrent ( parentMidlet . menuList ) ;




This is a simple class for representing the position of a mobile device.
import java . u t i l . Date ;
/∗∗
∗
∗ @author Vidar Drageide
∗
∗ This c l a s s implements the f u n c t i o n a l i t y needed
f o r r e p r e s en t i n g the
∗ geograph ic p o s i t i o n o f a mobi le dev i c e .
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∗ A po s i t i o n c on s i s t s o f in format ion r e l a t e d to
where the dev i c e i s
∗ connected to the network .
∗ The c l a s s a l s o conta ins f i e l d s t h a t r ep re s en t
l a t i t u d e and long i tude ,
∗ as w e l l as g e t t e r s and s e t t e r s f o r the s e f i e l d s .
∗/
pub l i c c l a s s Pos i t i on {
// Network s p e c i f i c in format ion
pr i va t e St r ing c id ;
p r i va t e St r ing l a c ;
p r i va t e St r ing mnc ;
p r i va t e St r ing mcc ;
// Geographic p o s i t i o n ho l d e r s
double l a t ;
double lon ;
p r i va t e Date time ;
/∗∗
∗ Method tha t f e t c h e s in format ion about the
current connect ion to the
∗ network from the phone .
∗ The API used here i s Sony Ericsson Sp e c i f i c and
uses the
∗ System . ge tProper ty (””) c a l l .
∗/
pub l i c Pos i t i on ( ) {
t ry {
// Fetch Ce l l−ID from the phone
t h i s . c id = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . c e l l ID” ) ;
// Fetch Local Area Code (LAC)
t h i s . l a c = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . l a c ” ) ;
// Fetch Mobi le Country Code (MCC)
t h i s . mcc = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net . mcc” ) ;
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// Fetch Mobi le Network Code
t h i s .mnc = System . getProperty ( ”com . sony
Er i c s son . net .mnc” ) ;
t h i s . time = new Date ( ) ;}
catch ( Exception e ) {
// TODO: handle excep t i on
System . e r r . p r i n t l n ( ”An e r r o r occurred whi l e
f e t ch i ng network ” +





∗ Getters and s e t t e r s , removed as none o f them
conta in s p e c i a l
∗ f u n c t i o n a l i t y .
∗/
/∗∗
∗ Method f o r f e t c h i n g a s t r i n g con ta in ing date
in format ion on the format :
∗ DDMMYYYY.
∗ @return S t r ing with date in format DDMMYYYY
∗/
pr i va t e St r ing getDDMMYYYY() {
long a = time . getTime ( ) ;
a = a%1000 ;
S t r ing da t eSt r ing = time . toSt r ing ( ) ;
S t r ing year = dateSt r ing . sub s t r i ng ( da t eSt r ing .
l ength ( )−4) ;
S t r ing month = dateSt r ing . sub s t r i ng (4 , 7) ;
S t r ing date = dateSt r ing . t oSt r ing ( ) . sub s t r i ng
(8 , 10 ) ;
S t r ing time = dateSt r ing . t oSt r ing ( ) . sub s t r i ng
(11 ,19) ;
S t r ing parsedDate = year + ”−” + date + ”−” +





∗ Standard t oS t r i n g method .
∗ @return S t r ing format ted : ” Ce l l ID DDMMYYYY”
∗/
pub l i c S t r ing toSt r ing ( ) {
St r ing r e t = ”” ;
r e t += c id + ” ” + th i s .getDDMMYYYY() + ”\n” ;







I made an inquiry to my cell phone provider and asked them to provide me
with a list containing my phone traffic. This list is included under as a figure
for reference and completeness.
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Figure B.1: A scan of the document sent to me by my provider. Most of the
originating numbers are blurred out for privacy reasons.
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